Animal Minds — Kristin Andrews on assuming consciousness in other species

There is no consensus on what minds are, but there is plenty of agreement on where they can be found: in humans. Yet human consciousness may account for only a small proportion of the consciousness on our planet.

Our guest, Kristin Andrews, is a professor of Animal Minds at the University of York, Ontario, Canada. She is a philosopher working in close contact with biologists and cognitive scientists and has spent time living in the jungle to observe research on orangutans.

Kristin notes that comparative psychology has historically resisted attributing such things as intentions, learning, consciousness, and minds to animals. Yet she argues that this is misguided in the light of the evidence, that often the best way to make sense of the complexity of animal behavior is to invoke minds and intentional concepts.

Recently Kristin has proposed that the default assumption — the null hypothesis — should be that animals have minds. Currently, biologists examine markers of consciousness on a species-by-species basis, for example looking for the presence of pain receptor skills, and preferential tradeoffs in behavior. But everywhere we have looked, even in tiny nematode worms, we find multiple markers present. Kristin reasons that switching the focus from asking “where are the minds?” to “what sort of minds are there?” would prove more fruitful.

The question of consciousness and AI is at the forefront of popular discourse, but to make progress on a scientific theory of mind we should draw on the richer data of the natural world.

Links

Transcript
(timestamps may be messed up!)

00:00.86
multiverses
Hi, Kristin Andries, welcome to Multiverses.

00:03.99
Kristin
Thanks, James. It’s great to be here.

00:06.21
multiverses
um So you’re a philosopher of animal minds and I think this is… you you are perhaps one of the first, if not the first, philosopher of animal minds, at least of the modern era, perhaps. um But there is quite a long history of people thinking about whether animals have minds. And from what I can tell from reading your work, there’s been quite a lot of flip-ropping historically on on on this question. Could you give us a brief overview of the kind of history of this this idea?

00:35.42
Kristin
Yeah, sure. So if you look at, say, ancient Greek philosophy, um you see that there’s a lot of engagement with animals, the animals that the Greeks saw around them, especially insects. There was so much interest in ants and bees and and the social insects that Aristotle and Plato wrote about. but Because they they were taking questions about ah philosophical questions to be answerable, not just by looking at other humans, but by looking at other animals as well. Because our default hypothesis was that these animals also have minds. They’re also doing things. um

01:13.73
Kristin
together in society. They’re also showing their intelligence. They’re also showing their feelings and emotions. Aristotle said that the other animals aren’t rational. Rationality is unique to humans, but they certainly have consciousness. They certainly have feelings and emotions. They certainly have relationships. But it wasn’t just the Greek philosophers. You see this across world philosophy. You see this in the Asian tradition as well, the Buddha famously talking about non-human animals and the avoidance of suffering in in all right living beings. um You see this also in Ibn Sina in Arabic philosophy, um ah addressing and just basically assuming that we’re not the only conscious being.

02:02.22
Kristin
So it was really not a question about whether other animals have minds or consciousness for these philosophers. There was a lot of question about whether other animals are rational, whether they engage in logical thought, what kinds of minds they have, but not that they’re the sorts of things who have minds. And I really think that we can trace it to Darwin or like blame it all on, I’m sorry. I think that we can trace it all to Descartes and blame it on Descartes. um for raising this question that we have now about whether other animals have minds, which animal species have minds, with his famous denial of mind and consciousness.

02:42.53
Kristin
in all other species. So we’re kind of clawing out of this hole that was dug for us um back a couple hundred years ago, and we’ve been making a lot of progress, but things have have have have varied a little bit because there was a lot of work done among psychologists in the late 19th century, early 20th century.

02:46.87
multiverses
Thanks.

03:07.75
Kristin
People like Margaret Floyd Washburn, um who was one of the first women psychologists, and she wrote a book called The Animal Mind. She presumed that animals um all animals were minded, and including um very simple organisms like worms. We see this in the work of people like Pavlov, who famously studied um you know dog learning. He said it would be absurd to deny consciousness to to these animals.

03:39.53
Kristin
And we see it in even in people like Thorndyke and Morgan. These are figures who sometimes are associated with behaviorism, but certainly they assume that animals have minds. So again, what we saw is there was this kind of clawing out of the Cartesian trap

03:52.69
multiverses
All right.

03:58.42
Kristin
and then um And then we get Skinner and Watson pulling us back down into the behaviorist hole and denying consciousness to to animal minds. Today, what, 2024? where We’re maybe 50 years out of behaviorism when it comes to human cognition. um But animal cognition research took a little bit longer to start recovering. And I think that most of the researchers I know who study animal cognition would say that the field itself kind of started in maybe the 1980s. We certainly don’t see textbooks in animal cognition.

04:35.90
Kristin
until the 1990s, and then starting around 2000, we see a number of different textbooks. I think it’s really good to look at textbooks if you want to know what ah what what’s going on in the science, right? You can see what the students are being taught. And interestingly, in these textbooks of animal cognition, there’s no no real discussion of how to study animal consciousness. In fact, what there is is a kind of a ah warning to students to not study animal consciousness. The animal consciousness isn’t scientific. um So there’s still work to be done because there’s science to be done on this question. And animal cognition researchers are great folks to be doing that work. So that’s a very brief history, I suppose, of kind of the ups and downs of of views in the world about whether animals are conscious.

05:29.15
multiverses
Yeah, yeah, I think it’s a really great summary and I guess The one argument we should maybe say that Descartes gave, just so so people are aware of it if they’re not familiar, is that you know language animals don’t have language. We’re the only folks with language, um at least with, well, that’s a controversial statement now. But but ah at least at ah in Descartes’ day, as far as Hino, we’re certainly the only species with language. And and it’s clearly the case we’re the only species with as complex a language as as we have.

06:01.80
multiverses
um And the other D that you mentioned, Darwin, yeah, obviously going in the other direction. um But I wasn’t aware until I read your your works just how forcefully he kind of denied there being any kind of um I think, as you put it, any fundamental difference between the mental faculties of of of animals and humans. um So yeah clearly he was acknowledging there’s some difference in degree of what we do um in terms of our mental faculties and and leaving the door open, obviously, for that being a ah difference in the cultural um inheritance of animals and humans.

06:25.64
Kristin
Thank you.

06:39.20
multiverses
But sort of at the biological level, I suppose, He was very clear in saying that we’re actually pretty continuous. um And um many of these behaviours that we see that we associate with minds in humans, we we find in in animals too. um

07:00.48
Kristin
That’s right. That’s right. It’s really worth going back and reading The Descent of Man because Darwin, in a couple of chapters of that book, which I love, um argues that we see so many rich emotions in non-human animals, ah including moral emotions, including fellow feeling for the other species, um right? Dogs feeling for humans. and also feeling for one’s children and members of one’s own species. It’s a really beautiful writing, but the worry that people had about the descent of man argument that Darwin made about continuity in mentality across species is that the evidence was based on anecdote.

07:48.71
Kristin
home These were really just stories that he collected from people who had traveled the world.

07:48.62
multiverses
Right.

07:54.56
Kristin
um And then he said, hey, look, animals are doing these cool things, so they must have these kind of cognitive and affective capacities. But what the comparative cognition research is doing now is they’re doing science to try to verify or or undermine the sorts of anecdotes that that Darwin collected. But actually what we’re finding is that these anecdotes largely reflect animals capabilities. When we look for things in non-human animals, we very often find them. It might take a very long time, um but sometimes humans are smart enough to figure out what animals are thinking.

08:33.50
multiverses
Yeah. and And coming back to comparative psychology, is yeah as you say, this in some ways this field is um still embracing behaviorism while that has been rejected kind of ah fairly roundly in in in human psychology. um But when it comes to comparative psychology, IEG looking for you know, the differences and similarities between human and other animals. It still seems to be flavored by that perspective. um You give a really good kind of rundown, I think, based on the textbooks um of three kind of big themes or rules, I suppose, which are a taught, drilled into um people who are entering this field, um that kind of embrace that um

09:22.62
multiverses
that, I don’t know, scepticism of animal minds and I suppose trying to move away, trying to be as scientific as possible, but perhaps actually doing a disservice to the science. um Yeah, could you give us a ah rundown of of those rules?

09:40.04
Kristin
Yeah, so Morgan’s canon is probably the best tool known rule that comparative cognition researchers are taught um and and still follow. So Lloyd, Seeloid Morgan, who is one of the advocates of animal consciousness, actually introduced this this rule that says we should prefer basically simpler explanations to more complex explanations for animal behavior. But as you might imagine, um there’s a lot of debate about what counts as simpler and comp complex.

10:14.05
multiverses
Yeah.

10:15.15
Kristin
and And this is a very difficult rule to actually implement. If you look go back and look at the way Morgan put this rule, um it was within a theory he had about cognition that’s been rejected. So he was looking he was saying, well, these are the sorts of cognitive capacities that are more complicated, and these are simpler. And so we should prefer these sorts of explanations. um But these details are completely lost in um and my disregarded because they don’t seem to fit the science.

10:45.73
Kristin
and so The way this Morgan Scanlon is interpreted today is that we should prefer associative explanations over cognitive explanations.

10:56.65
multiverses
you

10:56.91
Kristin
Now, what is what does that mean? That’s a really good question. um what that mean Putting it that way um introduces a presumption that cognitive explanations can’t be associative. But I think that we know that a lot of cognition involves associative processes. We do a lot of our work, our memory, our language learning, our um all sorts of reasoning processes through associative processes, associative reasoning. And so this distinction doesn’t seem to hold up at all. And so so some people will say, well, we should give explanations in terms of the associative processes and not

11:36.38
Kristin
talk about high level capacities like um theory of mind or mental time travel or planning, but we should figure out what the lower level implementation of those things are and when we’re giving the explanations. But then one of the problems is is that we don’t do that when we’re doing human psychology. We do talk about theory of mind, episodic, memory, planning, things like that.

11:56.38
multiverses
Mm.

12:02.05
Kristin
And so it would be doing the sciences of animal cognition differently from the sciences of human cognition. And then we’re not in a position to make those kinds of comparisons and ask questions like the questions that Darwin was was interested in about continuity across species. If we want to look at continuity across species and differences across species, we need to use the same measuring stick. We can’t use different ones.

12:25.50
multiverses
Yeah, yeah you you point out um that kind of one of the consequences of Morgan’s canon, perhaps, is just an opera operationalization of of language, um which doesn’t seem that helpful, where you know something a behavior that might term friendship in humans is called um affiliation or affiliate um ah connections, or something that might talk about episodic-like memory. And it’s not really clear what in what benefit we get from adding these new terms. um It seems like they’re being done to sort of pay lip service to this and kind of ostensibly distance oneself from um anthropomorphic and propomorphizing, perhaps. um But it’s not really clear that they’re necessarily more basic or that they’ve provided a simpler explanation. In some ways, it’s the reverse because they you know they they depend on their

13:23.87
multiverses
um you know, understanding of those things probably depends on what we see in in in in humans. um So yeah, it seems, I mean, Morgan’s kind of at one level strikes me as as a kind of an application of Occam’s razor and therefore kind of hard to argue with, but as a kind of, the the way that it’s been applied or the the heuristic that it’s driving is is is rather, yeah, is rather different and might actually have, in some cases, the reverse effect of ah leading us to the simplest explanation. like We might end up with very convoluted ways of trying to understand an animal’s behavior when we could just say something like, oh, it wants to do this, right? Or it you know yeah it’s caring for its it it’s young, right? So and yeah, we’ve we’ we’ve perhaps lost our way somewhat with with with Morgan’s canon.

14:19.93
Kristin
Yeah, that’s right. And I think that when we are explaining what an animal is doing at the level of of an agent and we’re interested in what they’re doing in their community, in their environment, um talking about them in terms of what they want to do or what they’re thinking and what they’re feeling. makes a lot of sense for those kinds of explanations, but it doesn’t mean that that’s the full explanation. It doesn’t mean that that’s the final story. right For any phenomenon, we can give different levels of explanation. The same goes for humans. ah you You can explain my behavior towards my family.

14:56.14
Kristin
um in folk psychology and say, yes, I love my my partner and my daughter and I enjoy playing with my daughter and my dog and things like this. um But it doesn’t mean that there’s not also, say, a neuroscientific explanation of that behavior as well.

15:10.03
multiverses
Hmm. Hmm.

15:12.67
Kristin
There’s not an explanation in terms of the the biology. There’s not an evolutionary explanation for what I’m doing. Explanations are answers to why questions. And we have lots we can have a lot of different why questions about the same phenomenon. um So it’s really important to remember in animal cognition research that if we’re saying things like, oh, yeah, the animal remembers what happened back there, um remembers where they cashed their their food, we we don’t um necessarily we haven’t necessarily answered the question that’s being asked if we want to know

15:48.06
Kristin
um something about the implementation level of that that capacity. right Where in the brain is this memory being stored? Are there memory traces? How are they stored? um these are These are further questions. And they’re questions that are appropriately asked in different sub-disciplines of the sciences.

16:08.62
multiverses
Right.

00:01.32
multiverses
Yeah and of course none of these explanations need be exclusive of another explanation either so we don’t need like maybe there is a place for Morgan’s cannon within a particular subfield but it shouldn’t be interpreted as saying this is the only way of understanding um animal behavior I suppose. um

00:24.87
kristin
Right. I mean, as you said, what we need in any of our scientific endeavors are um rules about you know having a bunch of different explanations and then deciding between those different explanations. And how we decide between those different explanations is going to depend on the the science we’re doing. So kind of there’s not really a catch-all. We’re not really getting any new information from Morgan’s Canon saying, prefer simpler explanations. where what we i think ah would be What’s more helpful um for animal cognition researchers would be some training maybe in in philosophy of science um and how abductive reasoning works, right?

01:05.37
kristin
Inference to the best explanation.

01:06.59
multiverses
Right.

01:07.37
kristin
When you’ve got a lot of different information about um what animals are doing or what or any phenomenon, and then you have multiple hypotheses on the table, then You pick the hypothesis that fits your evidence the best for now, and then you working with that.

01:22.40
multiverses
Yeah.

01:23.67
kristin
And then if something happens and that’s no longer the best explanation, you throw it ah out or put it back on the table and to pick up something else and work with that. I mean, that’s just how science works. So there’s there’s nothing really special or unique about animal cognition research, I think, um that requires that field of research to have its own special rule about how to do science.

01:46.62
multiverses
Right, yeah. and Perhaps we can talk about the the the the other two rules of the the three we mentioned, which I think are more kind of specific to um comparative psychology. I think I mentioned one of the words earlier, anthropomorphism. um So perhaps that’s a good one, or anti-anthropomorphism, I suppose, is is the rule. um So take us through how that gets adopted within comparative psychology.

02:14.01
kristin
Yeah, so ah comparative psychology really guides the students and researchers to not anthropomorphize their subjects. And what that means is treat them as if they were little um humans, right? Attribute ah human characteristics to them. And you might ask, well, what counts as a human characteristic? We have lots of features, you know, we have mass, we have um yeah have organs like hearts.

02:38.47
multiverses
Right.

02:45.85
kristin
It’s not so it’s not ah advising us not to talk about the mass of animals or their hearts. But what it does is it advises us not to talk about human unique characteristics when it comes to other animals. But the question that arises are, well, what characteristics are human unique? and If we go into the science with already a presumption about which features are human unique, then we’re not going to look for them in other species. And then we’re just going to reinforce this bias that we started out with. So I reject this worry about anthropomorphism understood that way, um because we should be asking broad questions about other animals. We can be asking questions um not just about whether they have theory of mind, but we can be asking questions about whether they have morality, whether they’re rational agents, um whether they make plans for the future. um These are all viable research questions that this this rule um

03:44.24
kristin
of anti-anthropomorphism just kind of shuts down. on it It just tells people, oh, don’t do this kind of research. It’s not scientific. um But it’s exactly what science is, asking questions about things we don’t know about and not making presumptions ahead of time about the way the world is.

04:02.14
multiverses
Yeah, right. I mean, I guess probably this rule was introduced in the spirit of a response to places where anthropomorphism is taken too far. And you know I can buy that sometimes that does happen. and um you know Perhaps with you know some of the anecdotes that that um you know Darwin was fond of collecting, certainly the ones which are more striking and therefore more likely to get picked up as an anecdote and get passed around are the ones where we see a very human-like thing being done by an animal, like a dog walking on its legs, like classic example rights um on its hind legs.

04:44.90
multiverses
um ah Lots of other species can do that, but it’s very striking when it’s a a dog that does that, or a parrot, you know, talking or appearing to, ah you know, at least saying words. So I, you know, I can understand the spirit in which it’s done, but as as you say, it completely closes off particular um avenues of, yeah, of questioning.

05:04.12
kristin
Thank

05:05.31
multiverses
um One thing i I do wonder is just, you know, about this word anthropomorphism, like just the word itself.

05:09.42
kristin
you.

05:12.91
multiverses
ah puts us in such a privileged position, right? I mean, is there any, are there places where we can think of things that might previously have been sort of thought of as very human qualities, um that actually maybe animals are better at, or you know, more, where where these qualities are ah perhaps more strongly instantiated in in animals?

05:43.64
kristin
Yeah, I mean, it’s it’s certainly um true that if we look at other species, there are definitely cases where they’re better than we are at lots of things. Let’s say um ah the perceptual capacity of echolocation. So we can kind of echolocate, right? We can, if you close your eyes and you you know make noise in your space, you can kind of get a sense of your space. We can’t navigate your space the way bats can or dolphins can. Echolocation is much more developed in in these other species.

06:18.59
kristin
So dolphins and bats are better than us at echolocation.

06:20.01
multiverses
Hmm.

06:20.96
kristin
And echo and you know we can we can say this about a lot of different perceptual capacities that other animals have.

06:21.07
multiverses
Mm-hmm.

06:28.00
kristin
Ed Yong wrote a beautiful book um called An Immense World where he detailed all of these different sensory capacities that other animals have. It’s really beautifully illustrated at this point. But then there are other kinds of capacities that used to be thought to be human unique. um So tool use is is a famous one, right? Humans as the rational animal turned into that that er Aristotelian view. got turned into this idea that humans are the only tool users. um And when Jane Goodall found out that chimpanzees make and use tools, Louis Leakey famously said, well, now we have to redefine man, redefine tool, or accept that chimpanzees are are human, something along those lines.

07:22.48
kristin
um So we’re learning, yeah, that chimpanzees aren’t as good at tool use as we are. We can build you know much more elaborated structures than the chimpanzees do. Our tools are more complex than the chimpanzee tools, but they’re also using tools. So there you know there there are there are these these cases where where we see similarities and degree where we’re still better than the animals in one sense, but we also see similarities um when the animals are better than than we are.

07:58.61
multiverses
But I also wonder about things like empathy or or social complexity more broadly where um actually animals may, yeah, they they may have more of those qualities or perhaps dimensions of those qualities that we don’t even appreciate.

07:58.70
kristin
Yeah.

08:17.68
multiverses
um And yeah, so this this idea that we are kind of transporting or transferring projecting, I suppose is the best word, human qualities on top of animals, and so in some cases could be kind of backwards, right? Maybe um those qualities are better understood in animals, or, um you know, more strongly um present than in humans.

08:43.44
kristin
Yeah, this is a good question. therere there I have a couple of of thoughts about this. One is that when we look at, say, eusocial insects, where they have this very different organizational structure, we see individuals sacrificing themselves for the group. right So you might say that this is like a um maybe a morally more developed society than our society or something. like One might make moral judgments about different kinds of social structures. We also see this willingness to sacrifice oneself in cetaceans.

09:11.39
multiverses
Hmm.

09:15.17
kristin
right When dolphins get stranded um and when dolphin gets stranded on a beach and all the other dolphins won’t leave them, um what’s going on there?

09:17.39
multiverses
Hmm.

09:24.13
kristin
Some people speculate that this is because they have a group mind. Others speculate that the empathy that they have toward the the stranded individuals so strong they can’t leave them. you know And so we can make we could make value judgments about these sorts of things as well. but i’m ah the Other example that came to mind when you said this was is something I’ve been thinking about a lot, and that is um multiculturalism in non-human animals.

09:51.39
multiverses
Hmm.

09:52.38
kristin
So we have you know today, there’s a lot of discussion about cultural appropriation and whether that is acceptable. um There’s a lot of objections when, say, Western cultures adopt elements of indigenous cultures or Asian cultures. um But we see in non-human animals a lot of cultural appropriation, a lot of learning from other animal cultures and adopting those new behaviors as they’re exposed to them. And this is not just across um you know the same species of animals. Say when an orangutan who, um let’s say a chimpanzee that uses a rock to crack nuts moves into a community,

10:41.77
multiverses
Hm.

10:42.35
kristin
where they use woodhammers to crack nuts and they might show them, hey, you can use rocks to crack nuts as well. Like this is the the sort of thing that can happen and in chimpanzee societies. But we can also see the sort of learning across species where um an individual, um for example, I’m trying to think of a really good example yeah I love the examples of nest making because there’s some theory that um that animals have learned about building nests from looking at other animals building nests and that they pick up on pick up on these techniques across species.

11:16.53
multiverses
Hmm.

11:31.89
kristin
And also medicinal use that there’s some ah evidence that animals who see other animals eating a plant in a certain time will explore that plant and learn about its medicinal qualities. like There’s not this worry about where the information flows and that the information has to stay within a certain kind of culture. There seems to be just this kind of gen more generosity in allowing others to acquire the same knowledge that that that is kept in a ah single community. So I like those i like these kinds of ah examples of how humans might be able to learn from other animals when we look at

12:10.50
kristin
how willing animals are to share information across species and across communities and not protect it in the way we sometimes do.

12:20.35
multiverses
Yeah, that’s fascinating. I’m sort of, humans obviously have tried to appropriate some animal thing, like I’m thinking of eventually watching birds flying and and try figuring out, you know, how could I do that, right? i had ah So it’s yeah, it’s it’s really wonderful to, I wasn’t aware of um that going the, between species the other way.

12:34.86
kristin
like

12:45.04
multiverses
I mean, the whole, I think the whole field of um animal culture, it seems so only so recent that that it’s being studied. I’m aware of the kind of guerrilla tool use case and how one side of the river they’re using the the rocks and the other they’re using you know something else to to crack these nuts. And yeah, it’s just something we weren’t aware of probably 100 years ago. And another of those things that’s been knocked down is, oh, this is uniquely human.

13:16.57
kristin
Yeah, absolutely. We are learning so much every day about grade eight behavior. And I think it’s really, it’s kind of critical that we continue doing this work, funding this work, training students, um spending our money to support this research, especially because these are critically endangered communities. And yeah, we can preserve the DNA of great apes and zoos, but we cannot preserve their culture and zoos. Their culture will be gone.

13:45.30
multiverses
Hmm.

13:45.90
kristin
we will not know what kind of techniques, they what kind of knowledge they’ve stored and developed over generations if we just take them and put them in zoos.

13:46.34
multiverses
Yeah.

13:54.96
kristin
So it’s really essential to do this work. And it is super exciting because, yeah, new findings all the time, right? We just saw these new um reports of of orangutan medicinal use, that orangutans use different different kinds of leaves as anti-insecticides.

14:05.20
multiverses
Hmm.

14:13.00
kristin
And we’ve continued to see this kind of evidence of of of great apes and other animals using ah plants as medicines in many different cases.

14:23.65
multiverses
And how um I have to ask about this because I’m um completely fascinated by it. um it’s It’s unusual for philosophers to actually get out into the field, out of the armchairs, as it were. um Dennett famously ah did it with vervet monkeys looking at their ah calls. But you’ve you’ve also been in in the jungle. um Yeah. danger of opening a big tangent here, but I’d love to hear just a little bit about that experience and, you know, whether you think more people should be doing that as philosophers, not just biologists and primatologists.

14:54.63
kristin
Yeah, absolutely. All of my students um have to have some time doing science in order to be a philosopher of animal minds. I think that it’s absolutely essential. And it’s great to get out into the field as well. So my field work has been with orangutans. When I moved to York University, I had an experience working in a dolphin lab um in Hawaii that was run by Lou Herman. Lou was working on things like dolphin communication using a gestural language, analogical reasoning, memory, things like that. Really cool work. um But I’d never been in the field. um And um I met my colleague, um Anne Russin, she gave a talk at York. She was in the psychology department and worked with orangutans in Borneo. And after her talk, I went up and introduced myself, said I’m a new colleague in

15:49.72
kristin
philosophy. I work on animal cognition and worked with dolphins and how how great dolphins were. And she was like, dolphins aren aren’t great at all. You should meet orangutans. You should come to Borneo. And I said, okay. And that summer, um i I went to Borneo for the first time and spent about a month with orangutans in a forest school. A forest school is a weird little piece of forest where rehabilitant orangutan babies are being trained to be wild orangutans. So it was at a rehab. um And there’s a lot of there are a lot of issues in Southeast Asia with the orangutan populations. As I said, there

16:33.84
kristin
or These are endangered animals. and lot of The reason they’re endangered is because there’s palm plantations that are being built and their moms get shot and their babies without moms.

16:45.61
multiverses
Hmm.

16:47.16
kristin
Or there’s pet trade and moms get shot and babies get taken away to be sold into as a pet.

16:47.47
multiverses
Hmm.

16:56.17
kristin
So there are a lot of baby orangutans and I met 12 of them um out of the

17:00.82
multiverses
Hmm.

17:01.92
kristin
kind of hundreds that were being kept in the of facilities locally. And these 12 were lucky because they were getting the opportunity to learn how to be orangutans. So I didn’t just get to go in and work with orangutans. I got to go in and work with orangutans who are learning from humans how to be orangutans, which was really bizarre.

17:21.88
multiverses
Right.

17:23.95
kristin
um And I saw so much in the first few days I was out there.

17:24.10
multiverses
Hmm.

17:27.71
kristin
I saw a lot of things that I had read scientific articles saying, that great apes don’t do. I saw deception. I saw um social referencing, like looking just looking at the human in order to figure out how I should respond to the situation. um I saw play and jokes and um relationships and curiosity. I mean, it was just obvious. You spend some time with these animals and you see so richly the their minds. In the same kind of folk psychological way, we richly see the minds of

18:01.65
kristin
of, like say, human children when we go and hang out and watch them on the playground. And so after I got back from Borneo the first time, I really did like going to playgrounds in Toronto and watching the kids. It was very similar experience, you know just looking at them and trying to figure out what’s going on in their heads.

18:12.23
multiverses
Hmm. Hmm.

18:19.80
kristin
But it was like it was a great opportunity. And then I went back a couple of times and I followed Anne to Kutai National Park, where she set up a wild orangutan site. And we went there, I brought my seven-year-old daughter there too, and we were tracking wild orangutans through the forest. I’m actually kind of running that site right now as my colleague, Alison, has retired.

18:42.66
multiverses
Wow.

18:44.56
kristin
This has been 20 years now of this time with orangutans. And setting it up so that Dr. Wendy Herb can take it over, which is gonna be very exciting. But, you know,

18:56.18
multiverses
You’re dangerously close to being a ah scientist.

18:58.55
kristin
Getting out of the field is great.

18:58.70
multiverses
but

18:59.79
kristin
i recommend I highly recommend it to anyone who has the opportunity to go and watch animals. And the field can be your backyard or your local park. ah Going out and just watch the animals do something ah for a while, whether it’s ants or squirrels or foxes, it it’s absolutely fascinating.

19:20.53
multiverses
Brilliant. Yeah. And I think, you know, particularly interesting as well, that you can also see the interaction of scientists with animals. Because I see that come across in your work that, you know, it’s not just the animal mind, but what is it? It’s what people say about the animal mind. um And i I imagine, yeah, in the field, like, you know, one is just forced to leave any, any assumptions about animals not having minds at at the door, as it were.

19:37.78
kristin
yeah

19:48.36
multiverses
And, you know, to make any headway, right particularly in, gosh, yeah, such a difficult situation as an animal rehab.

19:56.54
kristin
Yeah.

19:57.40
multiverses
um Yeah, fascinating.

19:57.83
kristin
Uh-huh.

19:59.88
multiverses
um A couple of last things on anthropomorphism. I just want to um when i get out or get two concepts into people’s heads. One is kind of critical anthropomorphism, which I touched upon briefly with Gordon Burghardt. previously. And another is anthroporectomy, I think, a term which you introduced. ah Perhaps you could give your kind of ah take on on both of these concepts.

20:28.85
kristin
Yeah, so critical anthropomorphism is this um idea that that really relates to the idea that I call um anti-anthropocentrism in my book, How to Study Animal Minds. The ideas are the same. So this is something that um that I think is important for animal cognition researchers to do, and that is recognize where there are differences between humans um and ah the animals that they’re studying. So don’t be anthropocentric. Don’t think that everyone is going to be like you. ah Recognize how ah different sensory systems are going to affect their behavior. Recognize how different you know desires and interests are going to affect others’ behavior. Recognize how different embodiments will affect behavior. and So it’s this idea that goes back to Von Uck’s goal when he talked about the tick. That the tick, like every other animal,

21:26.35
kristin
has their own world, their unvelte, their sensory world that matters to them. We cannot process every bit of information that’s in our environment. There’s way too much. Some of it we cannot see without instruments. you know I can’t see the molecules on my desk um because I don’t have the right sensory equipment to do that. I can’t see ultraviolet light because I don’t have the right sensory equipment to do that. I can’t sense the heat of other animals in my environment, etc, etc. But so others can.

21:58.20
kristin
And so for the tick, the their world is a world of heat and a few other things, but it’s it doesn’t have the same sort of um qualities as the environment does for a human. And it’s the same goes for a dog, right? Take your dog for a walk. Your dog is going to notice so many things that you don’t notice. The unveil of the dog is a lot of smells that we don’t register. um And so I spent a lot of time wondering what my dog’s smelling and thinking, wow, wouldn’t it be cool to be able to like see what happened an hour ago, the way my dog can see what happened an hour ago by smelling the urine of the dog that was there an hour ago?

22:36.17
multiverses
Hmm.

22:41.54
kristin
So this is, I think, the idea of um critical anthropomorphism or anti-anthropocentrism that we have to recognize what it’s like a little bit to be these other species when we’re studying them. um and And it’s actually a fun exercise to do as well, right? When you’re when you’re engaging with the animals, you’re trying to understand like, ah, what is it like to have a tail? What does this do to your experience of the environment to have this other appendage?

23:13.03
kristin
So ah so it requires some imagination.

23:13.29
multiverses
Hm.

23:18.56
kristin
And then answer andro um anthropectomy is this um was introduced um as a kind of flip side of anthropomorphism. So anthropomorphism, the idea again, is this attributing human characteristics to non-human animals, usually with the implement ah ah with the idea that it’s done without reason. And anthropectomy means cutting out a human quality from an animal, usually with the understanding that it’s done without reason. So the the criticism and the criticism of anthropectomy is this criticism that we’re denying a property to a nonhuman animal just because it’s a property that humans have. um And again, we need to do the research before we know whether or not the property is had or not.

24:11.91
kristin
But it was just naming a bias that and that Brian Huss and I took to do the flip side of the bias um that we ah that we see in the the worries about anthropomorphism. This is also something that Franz de Wallis are in quite a bit about. He calls it anthropodenial. And we just we just coined a new term for the same idea. um A lot of people have talked about this this worry that we need to have. um yeah We need to be able to recognize both kinds of errors if we’re going to be yeah discussing this on an even playing field.

24:45.87
kristin
Because really what we want to do in our science is to try to make accurate claims about the world.

24:46.30
multiverses
right

24:52.68
kristin
That’s what we want to do.

24:54.96
multiverses
Right, yeah, and I think just it’s surprising how putting a name to something can be so effective in flipping a switch and making people realize, oh yeah, that is a problem. um Yeah, and I think the, yeah, I really like your discussion of anti-anthropomorphism or critical anthropomorphism as, ah sorry, anti-anthropocentrism, um criticalical and anthropomorphism. I’m in danger of doing a bit of a Joe Biden here. solving constant These days I’m i mean i’m i’m constantly thinking, oh gosh, you know I just substitute one word for another. I’m on my mental faculties failing me, but I think we’ve got to approach these things in the spirit of generosity. Anyway, that’s a complete um by the bye-bye.

25:40.94
multiverses
ah but

25:41.17
kristin
have

25:43.58
kristin
yeah I called Descartes Darwin, so you know, I think you’re fine.

25:43.61
multiverses
ah so Oh, yeah. Oh yeah, you’re not going to be president of the US. We’re OK. um

25:55.71
multiverses
Yeah, so I mean, I think that was a really good um take on it. and And that is, I think, the third piece of the, ah you or the the third of the three rules, which is, of those three rules, the one but that you would agree is that we shouldn’t, you know, we do need to be anti-anthropocentric and um try to imagine ourselves in the unwealth of um

26:04.94
kristin
What?

26:17.65
multiverses
other another of other species. um And I guess, I mean, being critical of the first two rules, embracing the third, is it, let me put this in another way, is how much traction is this is this getting? All kind of comparative psychologists receiving your ideas and and actually saying, yes, this, you know, pesky philosopher of science actually maybe onto something. Is is it informing the the science, um these kind of criticisms that you’re bringing to the field?

26:56.88
kristin
Well, some of my colleagues say it is, but I think that i I’m not in a position to really know to what extent this is um has been widespread um and in any kind of acceptance. I do think that there’s a new generation of comparative cognition researchers who are more willing to investigate things like consciousness and more willing to do things like recognize you can have a relationship with your research subject. recognize that there are levels of explanation and that folks psychological explanations are not anti-scientific, but they’re a way of organizing behaviors into patterns that can then be used um when you’re investigating mechanisms or physical implementations at a neurobiological level.

27:45.68
kristin
So I think there is change, but we’re still waiting. I’m still waiting, I should say, for the next generation of textbooks to come out.

27:53.42
multiverses
Aha, yeah.

27:54.83
kristin
Yeah.

27:56.34
multiverses
Yeah, that will be really interesting to see. and i But I do have to say, I think this is such a fascinating example of a place where philosophy can speak directly to science. you know This is not metaphysics. It’s philosophy of mind, but in a way that really connects with the research. um and it’s you know your Your papers are probably mentioned, probably more scientific research than philosophical articles. if i I haven’t done a count, but i mean just though at least those are all the pieces that I remember are sort of drawing from scientific literature and saying, look, here are some experiments which seem very hard to deny that there is um you know something

28:47.27
multiverses
more than just behaviorism going on. there’s you know The best explanation of this is is that there is something um behind this, a mind behind this. So yeah, I do find it a really um great example of of where philosophers can productively um enter the scientific discussion.

29:05.94
kristin
Yeah, I mean, I would say I’m doing philosophy of mind as philosophy of science. And in order to do any philosophy of science, I think it’s really important to um to actually know the science well.

29:09.96
multiverses
Hmm.

29:18.28
kristin
um And so I had already said that i’m I tell my students they have to go into the field or go into the lab. They have to be exposed to the science. But I also make them read the science. We have regular discussion groups with scientists. um They get training in science as well as in philosophy. So it is quite robustly interdisciplinary research, which makes which makes it a lot of fun, I think. And we’ve had a lot of great conversations over the years with the scientists and in our our Greater Toronto Area Animal

29:51.27
kristin
cognition discussion group. It’s been very fun learning how to talk across disciplines because we have our own languages. It’s hard sometimes to translate um what we mean by terms and consciousness is one of those terms is really hard to to let people know what you’re talking about. um But we’ve had a lot of very good will because we’re all friends. And I think we’ve done a lot of really good work there and trained in ah a nice generation of of students and philosophy of animal minds.

30:24.31
multiverses
Yeah, let’s talk about one of the, so I think these criticisms that you’ve made are um i hope gaining traction and we’ll we’ll wait for the next crop of tax books to see. um I want to talk about one of the other very bold suggestions that you’ve made recently, ah which is that the null hypothesis in ah should be consciousness for other animals. um And you know that’s That’s new because when people people are in the business of looking for markers of consciousness in other animals at the moment, and there’s kind of a it seems to be there’s a kind of industry or so almost various subfields which are cons concerning themselves with looking for um markers of consciousness in in in other animals. um But you you argue that

31:17.36
multiverses
It’s almost inevitable that we find these. and what have they actually I mean, perhaps you can take us through um the case of C. elegans, which I think suggests just why we’re so likely to find you know consciousness might be so widely distributed in life. um Or maybe not, but at least the things that we’re doing to look for consciousness um probably get positive advances all over the animal kingdom.

31:37.27
kristin
Yeah,

31:47.76
kristin
yeah that’s that’s right. i mean it So right now, we don’t have a secure theory of consciousness, of course. um There’s a ah recent paper that came out that identified over 200 theories of consciousness that are on the table right now.

32:02.40
multiverses
Wow.

32:04.33
kristin
um And the one thing everyone agrees on is that none of these are secure. Some have better evidence than others, but none are secure.

32:13.86
multiverses
Hmm.

32:15.03
kristin
So what do we do when we are interested in questions about who is conscious, which other species are conscious. the The kind of best practice that we have right now is to use this kind of marker methodology. And the marker methodology goes back to right these ancient philosophical questions about other minds. How do we know that anyone has a mind? And this goes for humans too, right? I don’t see your mind directly. I see your behavior. I see your body. I see you know the environment you’re moving around in.

32:46.42
kristin
but I don’t see your conscious experience. I can experience my own conscious experience. I have direct awareness of it. That’s how I know I have a mind, conscious mind. um And the kind of general answer, John Stuart Mill gives us argument from analogy. Well, you’re doing the same things that I’m doing when I have a mind.

33:04.56
multiverses
Hmm.

33:04.72
kristin
So I’m just inferring that you have a mind as well. And so that really gets to this idea that it’s observable markers or indicators of consciousness that we are using in order to justify our commitment to minds in other humans and in other animals as well. And this is ah the marker methodology that is the the best practice for trying to answer this question about non-human animals. It’s used in animal welfare science, where they’re really interested in and trying to figure out how to make

33:35.14
kristin
living conditions more humane for captive animals, animals use in research or in agriculture. And it’s also used when people are interested in just a general distribution question like, which animals are conscious? How do we and how do we figure that out? And so I think that we can identify different like sets of markers to begin with. We have these kind of starting markers that um make us think that something might be conscious because they’re moving in ways that seem agential, that there’s this kind of biological movement. So this is humans, but also pretty much any animal we see, um moves in in ways that look goal-directed, whether it’s a bee that goes, you know, flies from flower to flower and in a way that makes sense, or an ant that’s carrying a little crumb on their back, going back into a hole with all the other ants,

34:31.38
kristin
or your dog that’s pawing at the back door when they want to go outside for a walk. and All of these are explainable and look agential. It’s also when we see ah you know the behaviors of animals that we know really well, like, say, your pet dog, that you have relationships with them. You feel like the dog’s responding to your emotions. You can respond to the dog’s emotions. Maybe you’re making eye contact. Maybe you play, things like that. these All of these are observable behaviors of the same sort that we have with other human minds that just justify, that can be used to justify our commitment that they’re conscious. but But there are fewer of these kind of initial markers with with some animals, right? Animals that we can’t see close up, that behave in ways that are very different from us. And when we don’t have relationships with them, like the ants and the bees um and sea sponge spores and

35:26.36
kristin
scary looking things that live at the bottom of the ocean. um These initial markers have less weight um and so we we look for other sorts of markers as well. We can look for neurobiological markers. These help um in cases you also with humans when they’re not engaging in the kind of typical behaviors. Say consider a human um with a disorder of consciousness who’s like a non-responsive in a coma. And we want to know whether they have conscious experience or not. Science researchers are able to identify some neurobiological markers that ah provide evidence of conscious experience in some of these patients. We could use this with infants who don’t yet talk or engage in a lot of really good goal-oriented behaviors because they don’t have control of their body yet.

36:17.33
kristin
um Presumably, we could use this with fetuses as well. um But we can use it with non-human animals who don’t engage in the same sorts of primary behaviors that we were often recognizing in and other mammals. ah and so In the case of C. elegans, this is a microscopic worm. It has a 304 to 20 neurons depending on the stage of development they’re in. um And they, ah you might ask, are they conscious?

36:50.84
kristin
Do they have these initial markers?

36:52.10
multiverses
Hm.

36:53.14
kristin
Well, they they have some of the initial markers. They have goal-directed behavior that we can observe through microscopes. We can see them move towards nutrient substances and moving away from um ah from substances that are aversive to them. But we can also use these kind of neurobiological markers in order to to help bolster evidence that they’re that they’re experiencing things as well. We can see that they’ve got a nerve ring.

37:23.90
kristin
We can see that they integrate information from different sensory modalities.

37:28.48
multiverses
Mm.

37:28.84
kristin
We can also look at behaviors that are a bit more complex and set up an experiment um to test what they’ll do in a certain condition. So for example, One of the experimental um paradigms that are used in order to provide evidence of of pain experience in animals is called a motivational trade-off test. This sort of a test involves exposing an animal to kind of two bad options. All right, so in the case of a hermit crab, the bad option to the two bad options are being shocked

38:10.31
kristin
um and leaving your nice shell. So they don’t want to do either of those things. um And so they’ll they have to weigh off, which is worse. um Bob Elwood and his colleagues have done a lot of work on this with with the hermit crabs. And what they found is that in that case, the hermit crabs will tolerate a shock ah higher shock when they’re in a higher quality shell um before they leave it.

38:36.62
multiverses
Right.

38:39.22
kristin
But if they’re in a lower quality shell, they’ll leave it sooner um with a lower a lower um range of a shock. um So they seem to value these these nicer shells more

38:49.48
multiverses
you

38:53.71
kristin
they’ll suffer more bad consequences before they suffer the consequence of leaving leaving the good shell. In the case of C. elegans, something similar was done with them. Then they um presented the C. elegans with a nutritive substance that they wanted, but then they put an aversive chemical um in front of this, the the food item. And so they waited to see what the C. elegans would do um

39:24.77
kristin
And hunger is one thing you want to avoid and going through this yucky chemical is another thing you want to avoid. And what they saw is that it took the C. elegans time to get for their hunger level to go up before they would go through this the subversive substance.

39:41.69
multiverses
Mmhmm.

39:44.38
kristin
And so this looks like it might be something similar to what was happening in in that the hermit crab case. So these are just very beginning pieces of evidence for C. elegans. As far as I know, none of the C. elegans researchers themselves have been studying consciousness or or markers of pain in particular in C. elegans. I think that it’s a really good opportunity to study pain experience in um in a very, very different system to see what sort of other behavioral ah markers of of pain experience we could um we can find in the C. elegans and then look and see what part of their their nerve ring is involved in these sorts of pain behaviors in order to try to get at

40:30.33
kristin
the physical correlates, the neurobiological correlates of pain experience in the C. elegans, which might then help us understand pain experience in us and in other mammals with our much more convoluted brains with our so many neurons um and so many you know brain structures. Whenever we study a simpler model in science, we make progress. And in consciousness science, we’ve not been studying simpler models.

41:04.30
kristin
I mean, the simpler model has been a macaque monkey.

41:04.52
multiverses
Hm.

41:07.44
kristin
That’s still not very simple. um And so I think if we switched, maybe not switched, but added to the research going on in consciousness science and started studying simpler models like C. elegans, which are readily available in labs at almost every university um that’s got a biochemistry lab, We might be able to make significant progress. um and And yeah, you know it seems like we’re like, oh, 20 years later, and we still don’t know what the neural correlates of consciousness are. We’re still stuck with these 200 plus theories.

41:47.56
kristin
But maybe it’s because we’ve not been doing the right kind of science. So I’m i’m super excited to propose this idea that but just we stop asking this question, oh, who’s conscious?

41:53.52
multiverses
All

41:57.70
kristin
Which animals are conscious?

41:59.25
multiverses
right.

41:59.62
kristin
And then instead say, OK, let’s just assume the animals are conscious and then examine different dimensions of consciousness, self-awareness, pain experience, um pleasure experience, and examine those very specific dimensions of consciousness in a variety of species in order to try to figure out how these are implemented, what the mechanisms are in those species. That I think is going to give us real progress.

42:28.56
multiverses
Right, so we move away from this distribution question to this question of of dimension um and also open at the same time, ah open ourselves up to looking at really perhaps edge cases of consciousness, um which I think is always something fruitful for science. Like if you can find where, you know, maybe it’s not C. elegans, but maybe there’s some slightly smaller ah brain where we just don’t find any of the markers of consciousness, and then we can start to draw a line between what is required at the physical level um before, yeah.

43:07.96
kristin
Absolutely.

43:09.85
multiverses
So yeah, I think this is yeah really promising. And I have to ask, are there other, I know you’re looking at animal, societal norms, and I am curious, are there, is there something analogous to be done here? You know, at the moment the question is perhaps, you know, do animals have societal norms? Should should it just be assumed that all animals have societal norms? That maybe even all animals have culture? Perhaps that’s too far of a null hypothesis, but um are there any new null hypotheses you’d like to throw out?

43:44.85
kristin
Yeah, that’s ums a super interesting question. um on like On the question of animal culture, I think that we’ve we’ve kind of, um we might be in a similar situation now because we’ve asked this question about um chimpanzee cultures in 1989, 2000, this nature paper came out. finding cultural differences and in different chimpanzee communities. And then 25 years later, what we found is culture in every species where it’s been looked for, ah including fruit flies, right including bumblebees.

44:16.16
multiverses
All right.

44:20.14
kristin
So and you might say, well, what do you mean by culture then? It’s been found everywhere. What do you mean? You don’t mean like museums and ah and works of art. ah So what what the scientists are referring to by culture are group level traditions that are acquired through social learning. this is ah in contrast with having innate behaviors, right? So one of the postulates of human uniqueness that I often hear is that, oh, humans alone are able to learn things. Humans alone are able to solve problems in real time when ah when they’re confronted with them in their environment, and then they can learn them from other members of their community. That is not human unique. That is found in fruit flies. That is found in bumblebees. um Social learning is widespread.

45:05.66
kristin
So I think that asking like about shifting the null hypothesis for animal culture to all animals um is we’re probably in a very similar situation to the situation we are with with the markers for consciousness, where I would predict we’d continue to find them as we look for them.

45:20.85
multiverses
Yeah.

45:24.88
kristin
This question of social norms is slightly different, I think, because we haven’t yet really done, even started an an empirical investigation of social norms and non-human animals. What we have is is kind of the place, we’re at the place where where Darwin was in the descent of man. We have a lot of anecdotes. We have a lot of stories about animals who seem to be enforcing patterns of behavior that exist in their communities. um enforcing these patterns either by letting young individuals watch them and learn them or assisting them by some form of teaching, um some some evidence of punishment in a few rare cases, ah but we don’t yet have a lot of empirical evidence. And I think that this is this is a point where we’re at a point in the investigation where it would be most fruitful

46:14.48
kristin
to just go out with this account of what a social norm is, that is a pattern of behavior that’s maintained by community members, either through a positive or negative reinforcement, um and and find out where they might be and what they might be in in different communities.

46:18.46
multiverses
Mmm.

46:34.46
kristin
Now, if you asked me to speculate how widespread they are, I think I’d be willing to to predict that we’re going to find them in lots of different animal societies as well. And I think that social norms probably are going to go along with any kind of group living animal that is that is conscious. And if we’re predicting that all animals are conscious or presuming that all animals are conscious, Maybe we should presume that all animals have social norms too. I don’t know if that’s fruitful right now for the science. In the same way, people often ask me, should we presume that plants are conscious too? And my response is, I don’t know if that’s going to be fruitful for the science right now. That might be too far of an edge case for us to investigate. We don’t maybe have the methods.

47:20.08
kristin
to to do really good research in that area right now. um So yeah, it might not be fruitful for the science to assume that all animals have social norms, but certainly we should look for social norms in any species that you’re studying.

47:35.02
multiverses
Right.

47:36.86
kristin
I think that that would be really, really robust and vibrant science.

47:43.30
multiverses
Again, I’m reminded of my conversation with Gordon Burghart and how in coming up with a definition for play, he kind of made it somewhat acceptable to look for those activities in in in animals, where before people had been very perhaps rather nervous about looking for um calling something play in animals because it had been deemed too anthropomorphic. um And again, you know, perhaps we have these overhangs

48:06.21
kristin
Yes.

48:11.27
multiverses
and this feeling that society is something uniquely human, but just unpacking the definition of social norm maybe just opens, makes people a bit more open-minded to look for those kinds of behaviors. And then once we discover them in enough places, we can say, well, actually, yeah, clearly there is there there are societies here. um

48:38.48
kristin
Yeah, well, absolutely. Being clear on what we mean by the question when we ask, do animals have culture, is has to be the first step. And that’s what really allowed for a lot of progress in the science of animal culture, um defining culture in terms of group level traditions that are socially learned. um One of the kind of ah trends, I think, in a lot of comparative psychology is exactly as you identified in Gordon Burkhart’s account of of play, is when we stop focusing on assumptions about what the cognitive mechanisms are and instead focus on the observable patterns of behavior and get really clear on those those patterns of interest and define them, we make progress.

49:26.81
multiverses
Hm.

49:27.19
kristin
um The next step once we’ve identified patterns of behavior is to is to figure out how the animals are doing it. What are the mechanisms? What do you need to have? What kind of neurobiological machinery um do you need to have? What sort of cognitive processes do you need to have in order to do these things? That’s a further question. um The first step really is identifying these patterns of interest and defining them really clearly. And so that’s what was done with play, what was done with culture, what was done with teaching, and now what we’ve done with social norms. And since this paper came out um that um um we had, I can’t tell you 10 authors on a paper.

50:14.75
kristin
in on how to study animal norms in non-human great apes, non-human primates actually. We found a lot of interest among scientists in taking up this question. There’s been a lot of enthusiasm in the conferences we’ve gone to, the conversations we’ve had with scientists. And our next step is to just get the funding and do the research. ah And once we do that with with great apes, I think is the first step. We’ll probably move on and and and explore it in ah other species. This is exactly how all things worked in culture. It started with great apes, kind of easiest test case because we’ve studied them quite extensively on this kind of so societal level. um But I think we might find them.

51:04.52
kristin
and

51:04.92
multiverses
Mm.

51:05.73
kristin
a wide variety of animal species. And it’s it’s so exciting to be at this kind of edge of knowledge too. I think that we’re we’re going to be learning more and more and should expect more of these kind of exciting ah discoveries as time goes on. And I think that once we make these exciting discoveries, it really does, but for me at least, it causes me to see humans differently, right? It causes me to see us as just another, you know, culture and of another species that also engages with other cultures and other species and that we are more socially interconnected um as well.

51:28.56
multiverses
Right.

51:46.00
kristin
And so right now I’ve got fruit flies in my kitchen, you know, it’s, it’s July. So I don’t know about you, but I’ve got, you know, a lot of fruits in my kitchen and they sometimes they sit on the counter and sometimes they get overripe and the fruit flies love them. And what I used to do is I’d make a little fruit fly traps with some vinegar and soapy water and, and saran wrap with little holes in them. and trap and drown the fruit flies. um But ever since I found out that fruit flies have culture and that they learn, female fruit flies learn who to mate with by watching other female fruit flies have sex.

52:24.22
multiverses
Okay.

52:25.20
kristin
i mean that’s so That’s so weird and cool and awesome. And since I learned that, and like I look at the fruit flies on my berries in a different way.

52:29.98
multiverses
Yeah.

52:35.54
kristin
And instead of making the traps, I just like take the bowl of berries outside and then brush them away and then bring the berries back and put them in the fridge or cover them with saran wrap. I don’t feel comfortable drowning the fruit flies if I don’t have to. So we I’m living with them, right? We’re living with these other species. I am not. you know, the only important person in the world in my house. It’s the fruit flies that live there, the the ants that live there, and the spiders that live there are important too. If the rats who live outside get in my house, I’m definitely getting them outside of my house one way or another.

53:11.54
kristin
If I have to kill them, so be it, but I prefer not to if I don’t have to.

53:15.44
multiverses
Yeah.

53:16.50
kristin
It just gives me a little bit more appreciation for all of the animals that that we live with. um doing this kind of research. And it’s it’s a nice way of of seeing the world. It’s a very friendly way. You don’t feel lonely when when you know your house is also filled with fruit flies who are learning who to have sex with by watching other fruit flies mate. That’s just awesome.

53:43.88
multiverses
I think I have so many more questions that I would love to ask, but I also feel like that was just a lovely point that you made, and and I can’t think of a better way to to end it, right? ah You know, if we can find such an appreciation for the humblest of of creatures um in a way that enriches our own lives, right? we it’s It’s not pure charity, like, to ah keep these through private lives. They they are ah you know just wonderfully fascinating things, um and they have value in their own right. So, yeah.

54:17.94
multiverses
um Unless you have, I don’t know if you if you want to add any other things, perhaps some information on, I know you’ve got a book coming out, so in case people are listening to this in the future, well, that’s almost certainly the case, but and yeah, if you want to get some notes on that.

54:29.10
kristin
Mm hmm.

54:33.04
multiverses
um But this has been such a wonderful conversation, Kristen, thank you.

54:36.69
kristin
Yeah, thanks, James. It was it was great talking to you. It was a lot of fun. And yeah, folks can check out my website, which I guess you’ll link to if they’re interested in reading any of my work.

54:46.68
multiverses
Yes, I will be. Thank you.

54:48.67
kristin
Yeah, thanks so much.

Taking Chance Seriously — Alastair Wilson on Quantum Modal Realism

Things happen. Or they don’t. How then should we make sense of claims that something might happen?

If all these claims do is express doubt, then the puzzle can be easily resolved. But if the claims capture some objective feature of the world, what is it?

Our guest is Alastair Wilson, a professor of philosophy at the University of Leeds. He takes chance seriously, in particular, he is a realist about our modal claims (claims like “either candidate could win” or “if Szilard hadn’t got Spanish flu, the atom bomb would not have been invented”) may be true or false, not just opinions or expressions of ignorance.

Alastair does this by connecting our modal talk to Everettian quantum mechanics. He argues that modal claims are assertions about the many worlds within the universal wavefunction. If in all worlds where Szilard did not succumb to Spanish flu, the atom bomb was never invented, then this claim would be true.

It is a bold and fascinating way of bringing physics and metaphysics together. What can happen, what is possible, what could have been? These become questions for natural science.

Transcript

00:00:00.00
multiverses
Did well, I guess.

00:00:01.71
Alastair Wilson
that

00:00:01.89
multiverses
um Hi, Al Wilson. Thanks for joining me on on multiverses.

00:00:07.32
Alastair Wilson
Thanks for having me on.

00:00:08.94
multiverses
um I’d like to start start by talking about modality. um Perhaps you can take us through this this term of art. What are we talking about and when we talk about modality?

00:00:21.05
Alastair Wilson
yeah modality is The term modality is a good example of philosophers taking something fairly familiar and making it sound unfamiliar with a fancy name. um really modality as I think about it is to do with alternative possibilities.

00:00:35.01
multiverses
you

00:00:35.51
Alastair Wilson
So there are various kinds of alternative possibilities. There are like alternative ways things could be as far as we know, or there might be more objective sorts of possibilities, possibilities for the way the world really could turn out. And my work’s been on the relation between those two kinds of possibilities, but with a special focus on that second question, ways the world really could turn out. And the contrast between ways the world really could turn out as opposed to ways it really couldn’t. um And the idea that we can we can discover facts about that sort of thing, as well as discovering just facts about the way things in fact do turn out.

00:01:14.43
multiverses
Okay, very good.

00:01:14.82
Alastair Wilson
So when we say that the world’s modally rich, we say it’s not just made up of what actually happens, it’s kind of full of possibilities as well, um unrealized ones.

00:01:15.07
multiverses
Yeah.

00:01:23.89
multiverses
Yeah. And and um that is a familiar feeling to everyone. We all feel there are many things that could happen today. And there are things that could have happened um you know earlier today.

00:01:32.84
Alastair Wilson
and

00:01:34.84
multiverses
Things could have gone otherwise. um So yeah, we’ve got a fancy label for it. um And what to what do philosophers want to say about these things? like yeah know What are the kind of approaches that one can take to modality? um

00:01:55.19
Alastair Wilson
but it’s like I’d say, philosophically, it’s always been a puzzle. um but Time has always presented a puzzle because you only ever see kind of one time at once, but the same person sees different ah times as they live their lives.

00:02:08.20
multiverses
you

00:02:10.44
Alastair Wilson
um But we only ever see one possibility for the way things could turn out, the one that we ah ourselves and inhabit. And we don’t ever see, we can’t ever see directly the other alternative possibilities. So we can kind of reason about them, think about them, but we never kind of bump into them. um And so that what when you’ve got something in that sort of more ephemeral category, you can have all sorts of philosophical disagreements about it. ah one of One of the core ones, I guess, what I think of as the core one is the question of reality, which is a question that philosophers love to ask, especially people doing metaphysics love to ask. So kind of our alternative possibility is real.

00:02:51.72
Alastair Wilson
Or are they just things we make up? Are they just some kind of human-generated, imaginary things? And I don’t think the answer to that is at all obvious. My own view is that alternative possibilities are real. In fact, they’re real and physical, part of the physical world. That’s an unusual view. um But a lot of philosophers agree that alternative possibilities are real. They just disagree with me about what kinds of things they are. But then there’s the whole more s skeptical view that says alternative possibilities aren’t aren’t real at all.

00:03:21.88
Alastair Wilson
There’s no such things. We kind of just imagine them or pretend that there are such things. Really, there’s just this world that we live in.

00:03:29.63
multiverses
Yeah.

00:03:29.99
Alastair Wilson
The alternative possibilities are imaginary.

00:03:34.05
multiverses
Yeah. I mean, I think there is a case to be made that um alternative possibilities aren’t real. um But maybe if we focus on, you know, if if we take the assumption that they are, um which I think is something we we do intuitively feel when we when we regret things, we generally think that things could have gone another way. And even though, as you say, we only ever see things going one way, in a sense, in that when there are apparent alternative possibilities, only one thing is realised.

00:04:00.19
Alastair Wilson
Thank

00:04:10.72
multiverses
Yet we do have this strong feeling that

00:04:10.75
Alastair Wilson
you.

00:04:13.86
multiverses
that that needn’t be the case. um And so I guess the philosophy here is trying to maybe connect with and explain um that, I don’t know, folk vision of of possibility.

00:04:27.93
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, I think really the kind of the crux of disagreement is whether the distinction between possibility and impossibility is one that kind of cuts deep, one that kind of is to be found in nature, as opposed to something that we kind of project on to nature. I mean, we definitely have different attitudes of the kind you’re describing to sit to things that are possible and things that are impossible. um For a start, we aren’t going to try to bring about something that we think is impossible. There’s kind of no point. Whereas if something we regard as possible, we might try and bring it about. But even if it’s kind of in the past,

00:05:05.59
Alastair Wilson
we might kind of regret something more if we think we could have done it differently. Whereas if we think it’s completely outside our control, there was no possibility of kind of us having done anything in it differently or things having worked out any differently. We don’t regret it in the same sort of way. There’s some sense there’s no kind of no alternative possibility there to mourn if what we kind of thought we wanted would actually turn out to be impossible. um So I think possibility and impossibility definitely feed into our kind of cognitive lives, both in the kind of future-directed, what can we do, what can we affect, what’s the point in like trying to achieve things.

00:05:41.32
Alastair Wilson
um along with that kind of past directed sense of ah what could we have done differently? What would have happened if we had? um And yeah, kind of for better or worse, yeah we care about those questions. We don’t just care about what actually happens. We care about how it how the relations are standing to all the alternative possibilities. And I say it’s it’s a very puzzling thing how these kind of ephemeral thing alternative possibilities could end up being so important to us. And I think it’s ah that’s actually a puzzle that most philosophical philosophical theories of ah vol alternative possibilities of modality don’t do a very good job of explaining. ah There are various theories of of possibilities of something like kind of

00:06:32.87
Alastair Wilson
property the world could have or complete sets of sentences that somebody could say ah consistently. um And those accounts can have certain philosophical virtues, ah but they don’t do a very good job good job of explaining why we care about these alternative possibilities so much. um if they’re only these properties out there not instantiated by anything, or if they’re only the sets of sentences that nobody ever does um kind of say completely or maybe even could say completely, why should we care about those sets of sentences?

00:07:12.79
Alastair Wilson
um So like most of the most plausible philosophical theories of possibility seem to run into real trouble in explaining why we should care about them.

00:07:20.37
multiverses
Uh-huh. Uh-huh.

00:07:21.65
Alastair Wilson
But we do i take that to be kind of data for philosophers to explain.

00:07:24.48
multiverses
Mm hmm. Right. So and maybe we can start talking about concretely one of the perhaps one of the most famous examples of an attempt at least to make sense of our talk of of possibilities and and modal talk. We should throw necessities there as well. um And so so I guess David Lewis um might be familiar to manning listeners here. And he had a project of modal realism and the and the sort of the clue is in the name.

00:08:00.21
multiverses
He was trying to ground or make yes make these modal claims claims about real things. and But perhaps you can give a description of of of how his project was worked.

00:08:13.89
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:08:16.79
Alastair Wilson
So I mean, i i I love Lewis’s project. I think it was kind of ultimately misguided, but kind of gloriously misguided and shows a kind of ah kind of philosophical courage that is kind of rare to kind of follow your kind of intellectual convictions where they lead. um Because I think Lewis’s instincts were all good ones, or mostly good ones, to think there really is something there in modality to explain these alternative possibilities. It’s something really deep. It’s not this kind of shallow um part of reality

00:08:50.05
Alastair Wilson
there’s alternative possibilities ah right there in the the basic structure of the world and are thinking about the world that need a proper theory to account for them. And proper theories should be, I think, things Lewis realists. If you want to explain something, you’ve got to kind of admit the reality of whatever resources you need to give that explanation. You’ve got to kind of be honest. If you want, you kind of can’t conjure real relevant stuff out of nowhere, you have to kind of um pay the suitable theoretical costs for the explanatory benefits you want to you want to secure. So Lewis, in wanting to kind of give a real, proper, thorough underwriting for ah modal thought and talk,

00:09:41.51
Alastair Wilson
kind of went huge, kind of kind of expanded out our conception of reality from one world like the one we live in to countless. um in Infinity of worlds kind of just like the one we live in. Real solid things, most of them at least, the ones that aren’t just made of ghosts. um Real solid things just like ours, just somewhere else as opposed to anywhere that we can get to.

00:10:13.40
Alastair Wilson
And this is a kind of incredibly bold theoretical inference. um But Lewis thought that in at least one sense it wasn’t too bold, because it wasn’t inferring to the existence of a whole different kind of thing that we’d never encountered before.

00:10:25.15
multiverses
Uh huh.

00:10:25.45
Alastair Wilson
In some sense, these other universes are just more of the same.

00:10:28.09
multiverses
Uh huh.

00:10:28.65
Alastair Wilson
They’re more things like the one we live in. So you know you his his his idea was that you could just kind of expand the quantity of things of the kind that you already believed in and account for modality that way without having to bring in any new mysterious kind of magical theming kinds of things um of a wholly different kind.

00:10:51.69
Alastair Wilson
in order to account for modality. So in some sense it’s quite a kind of cautious conservative view, you’re not expanding your sense of what sorts of things there are in the world, but in other sense it’s a kind of rat radically expansionary view, you’re expanding which things you think, how many of those things there are, you think there are in ah in a really big way. So he saw that there were countless possible worlds, um that, crucially, that those things were the same sorts of things that our world, and they only differed from our world in virtue of us being in ours and not in any of theirs, that they were inhabitants of all those worlds that are just as real as we are, thinking that they’re the actual ones, and we are mere possibilities. But kind of seen from the the God’s eye view, um we’re all kind of just as real as any others. There’s no sense in which one of them is really the actual world and the others are really just possibilities.

00:11:44.26
Alastair Wilson
they’re all kind of co-possibilities from that sort of point of view. And I think it’s ah it’s a beautiful, incredibly bold theory. Almost nobody believes it. ah Some people think even Lewis couldn’t really have believed it. And I don’t believe it, but I think that it ah is right, it stands a chance at least of being right about in some important respects. oh

00:12:12.11
Alastair Wilson
So I like the kind of different version of modal realism, which I guess we’ll come to too shortly.

00:12:13.04
multiverses
Yeah.

00:12:17.91
Alastair Wilson
um But I think kind of Lewis was kind of looking in the right, um in the wrong sort of place for the right kind of theory.

00:12:27.68
multiverses
Yeah.

00:12:28.21
Alastair Wilson
yeah

00:12:28.96
multiverses
Yeah. And as you say, I mean, there’s many nice properties of this theory. One is that While it massively expands the amount of stuff there is, it’s not appealing to some kind of hidden nature of things to explain modality, which is another approach to say, okay, well, I don’t know.

00:12:41.94
Alastair Wilson
i

00:12:49.21
multiverses
the reason you can’t build uranium spheres of a certain size is to do with causation and causation is just something we can’t see but it just necessitates things or um you know there are some there is just some hidden chance to other things.

00:13:02.67
Alastair Wilson
It’s not a thing. It’s not a thing.

00:13:07.90
multiverses
um

00:13:07.91
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, I mean, I think what um yeah yeah the kind of the idea of essences goes along, which will fix the bill if youre you’re describing there. There are a lot of people that want to say, well, I don’t know, ah charges of the same kind necessarily repel each other. Why? Well, it’s just in their nature. There’s nothing kind of more that can be said.

00:13:28.75
multiverses
Right.

00:13:31.01
Alastair Wilson
um And so you’re you’re you’re positing kind of natures or essences of things which can’t be seen directly, which are kind of responsible. um And if the world is full of those sorts of kind of rich natures or essences, then maybe we just need one of them um because kind of all of the claims about all the other possibilities can somehow be grounded in the essences in our world. But yeah, there are reasons for not liking that. It’s quite opaque how will we ever find out anything about these essences, for example.

00:14:02.03
multiverses
Yeah.

00:14:02.13
Alastair Wilson
ah And Lewis’s is kind of a very transparent view compared to a lot of the other ones and in the table.

00:14:10.62
multiverses
And it makes it quite easy to at least ah a certain level to understand claims about chance and probability, when you can take some kind of measure over these different worlds and say, well, you know, If I had got up a little bit earlier, then I would have made that bus. um Or at least my chances would have been boosted by 50% or something.

00:14:34.29
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:14:35.20
multiverses
And then, you know, you can look across those worlds. um Of course, you can’t actually look across them. And this is one of the problems we’ll we’ll maybe get to. But you can If you assume the godside view, then you could say, OK, well, if I look at these worlds where there is someone a lot like me and had started the day with almost the same circumstances, but they just got up a little bit earlier, let’s peer into those um there’s different places which are completely disconnected from this world. But let’s just imagine we can do that um and and see what happens and do some kind of count or or measure over them um to figure out, to ground our ideas of probability.

00:15:10.38
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:15:14.68
multiverses
whoops

00:15:15.92
Alastair Wilson
so So yeah, I mean, there’s definitely in in Lewis, something of that. So so Lewis famously has the um account of counterfactuals given in terms of his real possible worlds. He says the truth about the counterfactuals would have happened under which circumstances. ah up but oh are to be explained in terms of facts about the distribution of possible worlds. But interestingly he doesn’t do that tempting thing you described, which is to say there’s a probability measure over all the worlds.

00:15:46.97
multiverses
Right.

00:15:47.21
Alastair Wilson
The probability measure for him over the world is quite context-specific, quite high level, sort of projected on by us. He’s a humane about laws, which is to say that he doesn’t think that the laws of nature are kind of inherent to the world, but they are a matter of like the the patterns that happen to turn out and the best way to sum up those patterns. ah So all that has to say is goes to say that Lewis um explicitly kind of denies that there’s kind of in reality any a kind of significant ah probability measure over his worlds. There’s no sense in which there’s more worlds of this kind than worlds of that kind because there’s like typically going to be infinitely many of those kinds. um So Lewis actually

00:16:30.53
Alastair Wilson
um is keen to defend that part of the view, that there’s kind of no preferred ah measure of probability or of um kind of proportions of worlds ah in his picture. Because he thinks that if you had such a measure, you could make trouble for the view.

00:16:47.57
multiverses
Mm-hmm. Mm.

00:16:49.48
Alastair Wilson
He thinks you could maybe run try and run him into paradox or try to create skeptical arguments out of modal realism using such a probability measure. and um

00:17:03.18
Alastair Wilson
But the the idea that there is a probability measure over the possible world is a very attractive one. um John Bigelow developed these ideas in the 1970s as part of a theory a little like modal realism. And um Robert Pargeter talks about it as well. ah and It’s also a feature of the version of modal realism which, 30 years after Lewis, I find myself defending.

00:17:36.21
Alastair Wilson
ah

00:17:38.70
Alastair Wilson
That sort of version says there really is a probability measure over all the worlds. And it finds it in quantum theory. to so So it’s a bit of a left turn for this um kind of debate to have taken. And it’s not where Lewis would wanted would have wanted to look for his metaphysics. um But I’m interested in the idea that we can find contributions to this debate about modality from physics rather than kind of from pure metaphysics only.

00:18:09.15
multiverses
Right, good, yeah. So, and I think, I mean, let’s let’s start talking about that, because I think, you know, one thing that will just be very much at the center of people’s minds is, well, why should I believe in all these Louisian worlds, right? You know, okay, maybe there’s some convenience for being able to talk about modal truths, but that doesn’t seem enough motivation um to

00:18:33.76
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:18:35.67
multiverses
suddenly expands the set of things that I believe in to encompass all these ah you know counterparts of me and worlds where nothing like me exists but okay they’re they’re similar they’re physical worlds But I have no access to them. I can’t see them. I can’t sort of discover them or have no evidence for them other than the fact that we talk with modal language. um And furthermore, like why you know to your points earlier, like why do I even care about what’s going on in these worlds, um given that I have kind of no causal connection to them?

00:19:06.71
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:19:10.87
multiverses
um

00:19:11.19
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, it’s true. This is a tough um ah tough kind of line to to try to hold. I think it… I’m kind of sympathetic to the idea that there is a kind of purely philosophical case to be made um for something like modal realism. It wouldn’t go from the idea of kind of wanting to capture kind of what we say about this, about automated possibility, so much as wanting to understand ah what we do when we think with them.

00:19:43.28
Alastair Wilson
ah because the argument might go, it’s no coincidence that we’ve evolved to carefully weigh alternative possibilities when considering course of action. It’s no coincidence that we have these patterns of regret of things that we think we could have done differently, but we don’t have the same sort of regret for things. and We don’t regret that one plus one is not equal to three because we know that it couldn’t have been. ah and And so that’s a really deep part of our lives, our engagement with the world.

00:20:12.14
multiverses
Mm.

00:20:15.09
Alastair Wilson
Something has to explain why we think that way.

00:20:17.38
multiverses
Mm.

00:20:18.02
Alastair Wilson
For every other feature of the way we think, it seems there’s an explanation of of of why we think that way. um like our perception is there to kind of tell us facts about the physical world we live in, like tell us where the food is. kind of That’s a clear account of why we have perception. We need it to find food and escape predators. But why do we have this kind of deep rooted pattern of thinking about alternative possibilities? It’s not at all obvious. And I think some you know we need a substantial explanation there.

00:20:51.03
Alastair Wilson
And so it’s not crazy to bring in something like real possible worlds to to give that explanation if they really did give the explanation.

00:20:51.90
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:21:02.47
Alastair Wilson
But then the question comes, can these alternative possible worlds, these other things just like ours, really explain why we have these patterns of reasoning. And the causal isolation point that you just made, I think is a really important one. If they make no difference to us, then it’s really hard to see how they could help. Like maybe there’s something, some really kind of substantial explanation needed here, but you might think alternative possible worlds just couldn’t help because they are kind of separated off completely from our own. um And I think that does support looking for a view where the possible worlds are real and maybe are not so completely separated off from our own as all that.

00:21:45.74
multiverses
Perfect. I mean, and I think that brings us, you know, straight to Everatian quantum mechanics, um which is, you know, as you described, as you hint, I guess, um offers us a set of worlds, but worlds which are united somehow within um and and touching on one another at at ah um as well. Yeah, maybe give us a reminder of of of the kind of core claims of um Everett and and and and his formulation or interpretation of of quantum mechanics.

00:22:16.18
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:22:24.25
Alastair Wilson
Right. So the the phrase Everettian is kind of what a lot of philosophers and physicists, philosophers of physics will use. But this approach is more is more commonly known as the Many Worlds interpretation. That’s the kind of the widespread label. um And that label is controversial because not everybody that believes the Many Worlds interpretation thinks there are, in fact, many worlds. ah Everett ah Everett’s original argument in the ah 1950s when he developed this interpretation was more that there should not be any collapse of the wave function.

00:23:02.00
multiverses
Right.

00:23:03.06
Alastair Wilson
ah that we don’t need to have a collapse of the wave function as basic, and we don’t need to have indeterministic random probabilities of basic in the theory either. um And exactly what he thought we should have instead is disputed. The most common way of reading or developing the kind the idea that ever came up with is in terms of many worlds. um But there are versions of it that say that just kind of one world, but many different kind of groups of minds within that one world, so-called many minds of use.

00:23:36.09
Alastair Wilson
And there are ones that say we kind of don’t have any world or what or mind. It’s all about the kind of the relations of different states stand into other states, so-called relative states or relational versions of everything.

00:23:43.67
multiverses
Mm.

00:23:50.29
Alastair Wilson
um And so there’s a whole kind of tangle of different theories, different ways of understanding quantum mechanics there. ah And I’m most interested in in the many world strand, the kind that says there really are multiple quantum universes, and we live in just one of them.

00:24:09.65
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:24:10.59
Alastair Wilson
But we can kind of infer their existence from the results that we get of quantum experiments done in our world.

00:24:21.42
Alastair Wilson
There’s a sense in which what we see when we do a quantum experiment is is something like a kind of shadow of the other world or an echo of it. ae So we don’t kind of we don’t see things in other worlds directly. We can never travel to them. But their existence makes a difference to what we see, because if they weren’t there, we would have no explanation for why the quantum experiments that we do do turn out the way they do.

00:24:47.54
multiverses
Right. Yeah, and I think just to um i mean’ refer people to the episode with David Wallace, where we go into a lot of detail on the motivations for the for many worlds. But as you as you mentioned, it’s all the Everett interpretation in in general, and David Wallace is sort of formulation of that is very much in the many worlds or multiverse way of things. ah But as you as you mentioned, it was a solution to this this kind of measurement problem where um people are puzzling over ah the apparent fact that when measurements took place, according to quantum mechanics, at least in the early days, people would say, okay, well, when you do take a measurement,

00:25:31.61
multiverses
um this this mathematical thing, the wave function, ah doesn’t evolve smoothly and nicely as it normally does, but at the point at which someone decides to ah inspect ah you know how it looks, what it’s doing, it suddenly kind of collapses and changes shape very, very abruptly. um And it it wasn’t, you know, firstly, it’s not clear what a measurement is, what defines that. um And, you know,

00:26:05.17
multiverses
it wasn’t clear at least to Everett that you needed that at all. Maybe you could just stick with the nice smoothly evolving wave function, this thing which is describing the the physical state of the world, um and at points where it sort of seems to do things that you don’t see, like maybe electron going through two slits at once. um Well, actually, perhaps it is, right? Perhaps it is going through two suits at once, and but as at the points at which you try to expand that very microscopic event out into something on the visible scale.

00:26:40.47
multiverses
um Then it, you know, it appears as if it just went through one slit. um But what you actually end up with is it did go through both slits, but you have kind of two worlds.

00:26:50.08
Alastair Wilson
Yes.

00:26:51.82
multiverses
Or maybe you always had two worlds, one where it was going to go through one slit and another it was going to go through another split ah slit. um So yeah I think I just want to remind people that

00:27:04.77
multiverses
While again, it seems like we might be introducing a whole lot more stuff into the world, the kind of spirit of um Everett was was one of pass money and and and not trying to add anything extra to the physics or or to the philosophy, um to kind of use David Wallace’s phrase, but to you know just take quantum mechanics at its word, I guess. um

00:27:29.13
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:27:31.68
Alastair Wilson
so

00:27:34.31
Alastair Wilson
um ah um

00:27:46.49
multiverses
Well, perhaps I can say here, I do really like your way of thinking about, um in your book, um I think you can use the analogy of a kind of jigsaw, a piece of a jigsaw puzzle, to to to to try to tease out this way of understanding that even in the Everett multiverse, we really don’t have access to these other worlds.

00:27:48.69
Alastair Wilson
but

00:28:10.44
multiverses
um But what we do sort of have access to is evidence of the edges of them, I guess, or evidence of the machine that has created our jigsaw piece.

00:28:20.40
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:28:23.98
multiverses
And from that we can infer that it’s sort of created a whole jigsaw. um pat I don’t know if you can kind of cash that out um further because I thought that was a beautiful analogy.

00:28:31.93
Alastair Wilson
Yeah. Well, if you found the jigsaw piece lying around um outside, what would be the most reasonable conclusion that it had been made ah just on its own and then dropped outside, or that a jigsaw puzzle containing it had been made, it had been somehow separated from the rest of its pieces and then dropped outside? The latter is much more common because we can make sense of um why someone would make a whole ah puzzle.

00:29:10.10
Alastair Wilson
We would make sense of why any given piece might have dropped out of that puzzle. It’s hard to make sense of why a piece might have just kind of existed on its own without any puzzle to go in. It would have been an odd thing to make.

00:29:18.91
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:29:20.60
Alastair Wilson
um And broadly speaking, you can make the same kind of inference for words. If you see ah the results of quantum experiments and can’t explain those without bringing in something peculiar and mysterious, the collapse of the wave function, but you can explain it by inferring that there are more worlds just the same as ours.

00:29:53.46
Alastair Wilson
ah then you’re doing again what David Lewis did and you’re kind of use it you’re you’re kind of saying, well, we’ll just have more of things the kind of things we’ve already got and use those to give an explanation. And those things can’t be themselves mysterious because we you know we we we know what they’re like. We live in one of them.

00:30:10.54
multiverses
Hm.

00:30:10.87
Alastair Wilson
This world isn’t mysterious. So more things like this can’t be any more mysterious either. Whereas the collapse of the wave function, especially if it connects up, if it’s supposed to connect up to things like consciousness or um kind of human observation ah in some distinctive way, that is mysterious. I mean physics never otherwise connects up with consciousness. It would be kind of peculiar if we had to bring consciousness in just when quantum mechanics ah came along. Whereas if our quantum world was one of many,

00:30:44.72
Alastair Wilson
um then all we’ve got is more of the same sorts of things we already live in. And so that’s the sense in which it’s sort of with a conservative view. um And I mean, expanding our horizons isn’t a isn’t a new thing for science to do. I mean, people used to think the world was a few hundred miles wide. They found out it was a lot bigger than that. Then they found out ours is not the only planet. And they found out ours is not the only so star system.

00:31:08.86
multiverses
Uh

00:31:10.28
Alastair Wilson
They found out ours is not the only galaxy. um Ours is not the only concrete universe is really not very big a step beyond that.

00:31:14.18
multiverses
-huh.

00:31:19.09
Alastair Wilson
it’s The fact is these things are getting harder to see each time um to the extent that we can only see the other universes kind of by the the traces they leave um in quantum experiments, so to speak, the shape of the edge of our own jigsaw piece. But you know that’s evidence nonetheless, I think.

00:31:35.02
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:31:37.87
Alastair Wilson
um And it’s evidence for a kind of thing we’re already used to believing in.

00:31:42.82
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:31:42.94
Alastair Wilson
a world like ours. So putting all of these things together, I think you can make a case that the Many Worlds interpretation is certainly kind of no less bizarre than the other alternative interpretations. The bizarreness just amounts to how much stuff there is. But already our universe with all the stuff we think there is in it would have seemed bizarre to somebody living 2,000, 5,000 years ago. Like how could the world be that big? um

00:32:15.13
Alastair Wilson
Isn’t that bizarre? Yeah, we don’t think it’s bizarre now. And so maybe in 500 years’ time, the idea that there’s many quantum worlds just like our own won’t seem bizarre at all.

00:32:25.67
multiverses
Yeah, yeah. I mean, I’m suddenly very sympathetic to this view, as as as you’ll know. And ah yeah I’m hopeful that more people will be won over. But let’s just take it as, you know, canonical, right? like Let’s just, let’s buy into the, you know, these ever-ashian worlds. um You know, where does that, how does this connect to, and it seems like it’s a very simple kind of relationship between um Lewis’s view and this new one, except we now have motivation to believe in these worlds.

00:33:05.11
multiverses
We have strengths on these worlds.

00:33:05.19
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, so I said that I think Lewis had kind of got a lot of stuff right, but was kind of looking for the worlds in the wrong place. um And the place he was looking for them was somewhere kind of completely causally cut off from ours with no kind of common ah mechanism, generating all the different worlds, ah no mechanism for him generating them at all. um And, in thinking of them that way, it does make it really hard.

00:33:36.42
multiverses
Uh huh.

00:33:36.95
Alastair Wilson
You seem to cut off any possible explanation for how those things could be relevant to us, why we should care about them, why it is that we think about automated possibilities so much and we make our plans by by thinking thinking them through.

00:33:39.78
multiverses
Uh huh.

00:33:52.85
Alastair Wilson
And one one reason why kind of Lewis didn’t want to kind of look to physics for what those worlds might be like, was because he thought physics itself had to be contingent. if He thought physics itself had to be the kind of thing that varied across those worlds.

00:34:14.89
multiverses
Right.

00:34:15.77
Alastair Wilson
So if um like

00:34:19.91
Alastair Wilson
you know The actual physics gives us some worlds. For Lewis, those worlds would all be inside one of his worlds because they would all be generated by the physics of one of his worlds.

00:34:24.79
multiverses
Uh huh.

00:34:30.31
Alastair Wilson
And then he also thought there was going to be other worlds with different physics where quantum mechanics was false. And so quantum mechanics couldn’t be an account of those possible worlds.

00:34:37.33
multiverses
Uh

00:34:40.67
Alastair Wilson
It’s not even true about them.

00:34:42.59
multiverses
huh.

00:34:43.48
Alastair Wilson
And so it was actually that conviction that physics is contingent, that alternative fundamental physics is are possible. and that quantum mechanics, even if it’s true, could have been false. It’s those sorts of convictions that led Lewis to kind of write the kind of option I’ve described off the table altogether. he didn’t He just didn’t think that quantum mechanics could possibly account for all the possibilities, because he was convinced that there was a possibility where quantum mechanics was false.

00:35:07.67
multiverses
right

00:35:08.33
Alastair Wilson
But the question is, why why think that?

00:35:08.33
multiverses
so what

00:35:11.28
Alastair Wilson
ah And I think we can just give up on the idea that quantum mechanics could have been false. as easily, really, as we can give up on the idea that mathematics could have could have been false. um We don’t think two and two could have been five. um Ultimately, I think we can come to a conclusion where we don’t think quantum mechanics could have been false either.

00:35:27.47
multiverses
Right. Yeah, I think that’s one of the most kind of bold claims that but you make, because like I feel like many people will want to say, well, yeah, OK, so Lewis, he had some difficulties in sort of connecting why we care about these alternative worlds. But they really encompassed all of the sort of things that we we do with our modal language, because we do say things like, well, ah you know,

00:35:50.21
Alastair Wilson
Thank

00:35:58.73
multiverses
If this world, you know, if our physics were different, then, you know, this world would would be quite different.

00:35:58.83
Alastair Wilson
you.

00:36:05.92
multiverses
There’s this whole sci-fi, you know, franchises that could be ah based on this. um

00:36:14.64
multiverses
and And therefore, if we want to claim, I mean, here’s the key thing. There’s nothing stop us stopping us from saying those things. But if we want to claim that there’s some truth to those things, then we’ll need to say, you know one of the approaches at least is to is to say, well, actually those alternative um worlds which don’t have the physics, which we we do in fact have, do represent something real. And that’s how we, make sense of, but of that and that’s how we can say, okay, I don’t know if the Planck constant were different then, and if it was, I don’t know, 10% larger, then all these things would follow through. um And that claim becomes, is something that’s ah a candidate for truth or falsity. On the other hand, you’re saying, well, no, okay, all of the, all that is,

00:37:14.80
multiverses
there is what is real and what is physically real are kind of co-extensive. They map onto the same set of things. There is nothing that is um real that is not physically real, if I understand correctly.

00:37:32.81
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, nothing is possible that’s not physically possible. So um the it it’s true that we can imagine a lot of things that are going to turn out not to be possible on this sort of view.

00:37:36.31
multiverses
Yeah.

00:37:46.77
Alastair Wilson
Imagine something like accelerating past the speed of light. It’s just not possible. There’s no quantum universe where something does that. um

00:37:58.38
Alastair Wilson
But actually, I think the possibilities out there in the the quantum multiverse in the space of all the different quantum possibilities are really very various um and very varied, including things that would be kind of apparent violation of laws. um So there’s definitely alternative possibilities where kind of a large amount of water kind of spontaneously shoots out of the ocean in a unpredictable water spout with no calm warning and knocks any given bird out of the sky.

00:38:24.61
multiverses
Mmhmm.

00:38:31.92
Alastair Wilson
like Bad luck for that bird. um like any That could happen at any time to any any bird. It would take a kind of pretty unlikely quantum events to do that, but it there’s there’s no impossibility there. And so kind of a lot of the things that we kind of imagine that I don’t know you might see in even in sci-fi are going to turn out to be actually possible because they just don’t involve violations of the Lord of Nature, just some really, really unlikely events.

00:39:02.51
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:39:04.34
Alastair Wilson
Of course, there are going to be other narratives that do violate the Lord of Nature. um But it’s not, I think, automatic that every story we can tell has to correspond to a genuine possibility.

00:39:17.38
multiverses
Right.

00:39:17.47
Alastair Wilson
At the start, I started off by distinguishing between things that really could happen and things that really can’t happen. And that distinction, I think, nobody can really make a good case that that distinction is completely transparent. I mean, some things seem to be possible, but aren’t.

00:39:32.67
multiverses
Uh

00:39:32.81
Alastair Wilson
And then some things seem to be impossible and it turns out that they are actually after all possible. So Kant famously declared that space-time was necessarily Euclidean in its structure, that it it necessarily didn’t have any curvature to it.

00:39:38.09
multiverses
-huh.

00:39:46.57
Alastair Wilson
These days, the but the contemporary view of space is that it is curved. um according to our best series of gravity and general relativity, in quantum to gravity there’s such a thing as space-time curvature. um So science going by can kind of teach us that things we thought were possible are actually impossible. It can teach us things that we thought were impossible are actually possible. So the boundary between the possible and the impossible shifts over time as we learn more.

00:40:11.99
multiverses
Yeah.

00:40:14.33
Alastair Wilson
um And so Even Lewis, with all his possibilities, you still can’t allow for every hypothesis we might take seriously. like Think about maths. Think about the hypothesis that there’s a largest prime number. It turns out to be impossible. um It’s actually quite easy to prove that it’s impossible. But in somebody that hasn’t come across the proof, but has encountered the constant their prime number, it’s probably going to regard that as they cannot open possibility.

00:40:49.53
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:40:50.17
Alastair Wilson
And so they might reason, well, if there is a largest prime number, it’s got to be pretty big.

00:40:52.89
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:40:54.37
Alastair Wilson
um And Lewis can’t make sense of that sort of possibility, because for him, every Lewis world has a largest, has no largest prime number.

00:41:00.19
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:41:04.56
Alastair Wilson
um And so already certain things that we might want to kind of think about, theorize about, try to imagine, try to reason about aren’t going to be found anywhere in Lewis’s ah plurality of worlds. um And so you have to kind of give a different account of what it is to find out that there couldn’t be a largest prime number. um that There is no largest prime number. It’s not a matter of kind of ruling out the possibilities with the largest prime number because there aren’t any.

00:41:36.88
Alastair Wilson
um So in the same way, for everything we think we can imagine that um we can’t find the possibility for in the quantum multiverse, there are things we might think we can imagine that we can’t find the possibility for in Lewis’s picture either. For a modal realist, possibility isn’t something that we can just directly read off.

00:42:00.35
multiverses
Mm hmm. Mm hmm.

00:42:01.75
Alastair Wilson
We can be wrong about it. because it is responsive to reality. It’s like if there really is a world like that, then it’s really possible. And if there isn’t, then it’s really impossible. And sometimes it might not be obvious which.

00:42:13.42
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:42:13.88
Alastair Wilson
um So I think this is actually a kind of in the end, an advantage of a view like modal realism. It makes room for understanding how we can be wrong about in our judgments of possibility and how we can correct them over time in response to evidence.

00:42:22.56
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:42:29.66
Alastair Wilson
um we might think there’s a world of a certain kind and conclude there isn’t. But once we get ourselves used to doing that, we should be open to kind of more perhaps surprising hypotheses about what all the possibilities are like, for example, that they are all quantum possibilities.

00:42:49.30
multiverses
And as you said, it leaves open, and I mean, quantum physics leaves open a lot of possibilities. You mentioned these kind of random water spouts just popping up. um And you nicely characterize or the difference between those kind of quantum miracles and also thermodynamic miracles and the latter a bit more um common, I guess, but still pretty uncommon. So one could

00:43:14.99
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, I mean, a water spout actually would be that sort of thing. ah Maybe something I don’t make was not the best term for them, but something that could happen um just by kind of a fortunate conspiracy of the motions of all the particles of water.

00:43:27.38
multiverses
Yeah.

00:43:31.39
Alastair Wilson
And you could you could have a water spout like that launched by some very likely quantum tinkerings, or it could be just um more of a coincidence without any particularly quantum unlikely events.

00:43:42.48
multiverses
Yeah.

00:43:45.27
Alastair Wilson
giving us.

00:43:45.46
multiverses
Yeah.

00:43:45.67
Alastair Wilson
But the feature of quantum mechanics, um the feature the twin feature of linearity and unitarity,

00:43:53.03
multiverses
yeah

00:43:53.20
Alastair Wilson
oh just kind of pretty much guarantee that you’ll be able to find possibilities like that. Because it’s it basically says kind of for only two possibilities that are possible, there’s kind of one in between them that’s also possible.

00:44:05.84
multiverses
Yeah, right.

00:44:05.98
Alastair Wilson
um And so you get a kind of fullness of the space of possible of quantum possibilities

00:44:11.78
multiverses
So, for example, I could um very, I mean, just as a ah thermodynamic miracle would be me sort of floating up into the air pushed by lots of air molecules. A quantum one would be

00:44:23.23
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, some sudden unlikely gusts of wind.

00:44:25.51
multiverses
Yes, yes, exactly.

00:44:27.29
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:44:27.34
multiverses
um And a quantum one would be be just teleporting all of my, all of the tails of the wave function of my atoms suddenly sort of appearing or like concentrating in a manifesting in ah and another location of of space. um

00:44:47.59
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:44:49.28
multiverses
And both of those are are um possible. I’ve just never encountered them yet. And even beyond this, there might be possibilities to do with, I guess this is an open question, to do with the structure of space time itself that are afforded for within um quantum mechanics. So, well, there’s certain things that are kind of unchangeable and I

00:45:08.35
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

00:45:12.21
multiverses
carefully picks the Planck constant as one of them. There are other things which, at the moment at least, are up for grabs and, you know, certain, yeah, certain features of the space which might vary across worlds. It might turn out that, you know, when we have a more advanced theory of, you know, when we have a kind of final theory of physics, if we ever get there, it could rule out those things being otherwise.

00:45:42.34
Alastair Wilson
yeah

00:45:43.12
multiverses
But in our current state, at least, we can um we can

00:45:49.69
multiverses
It may be the case. It may be the case that there is a there are modal truths about um worlds with slightly different physics, is even though quantum mechanics is overarching in E, correct?

00:46:03.12
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, so i i i was I was controlling on this point, I think it’s important that on any kind of mode of realism, we can kind of be wrong about what the possibilities are. It’s kind of not up to us what the possibilities are, it’s up to reality. It’s like which possibilities are really out there?

00:46:20.16
multiverses
Mmhmm.

00:46:21.89
Alastair Wilson
Which possibilities ah does reality kind of really afford us? And ah One of the things I really like about the the view I’ve been describing as this sort of quantum modal realism um is that it makes those questions about what possibilities there are, just be straightforward scientific questions. So is it compatible with fundamental physics? If so, there’s guaranteed to be a possibility out there with it in. Is it incompatible with fundamental physics? Guaranteed not to be a possibility out there. We don’t know all the truths about fundamental physics. And even if we did know the truth fundamental physics, it’s not obvious to work out whether um certain things described in biological language are going to be compatible with um fundamental physics or not.

00:47:13.57
Alastair Wilson
So it doesn’t give us all the answers, but at least it kind of gives us traction on it. It like it lets science get a grip on the facts about what’s possible and what isn’t. And I think that’s ah kind of crucial because one of the biggest kind of embarrassments for philosophy of modality of possibility and necessity is that nobody can give a halfway plausible account of how we know ah what is, what really is and what isn’t possible. um and kind of how we can be wrong about it and correct ourselves on it.

00:47:44.98
Alastair Wilson
Philosophers have really struggled to give any kind of plausible account of that. Whereas um the quantum motorist picture just kind of makes it a matter of what quantum possibilities there are.

00:47:58.46
multiverses
Uh

00:47:59.35
Alastair Wilson
So I’ve mentioned kind of fundamental physics, like kind of what the particles and so on can do, but it also involves cosmology in a pretty basic way.

00:48:04.22
multiverses
-huh.

00:48:11.57
Alastair Wilson
um So we know that kind of whatever the initial quantum state of the universe was, it could have produced a world like ours. like Ours is one of the quantum possibilities that derived from whatever the initial quantum state of the universe was.

00:48:24.51
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:48:28.43
Alastair Wilson
um And we know there are others as well, um probably ones without any life in.

00:48:37.36
Alastair Wilson
The kind of question is, though, kind of just how weird are the quantum worlds that are out there. There are ones that kind of differ um from hours in of whether the sun’s shining in today. There’s ones that differ ah from hours in terms of whether the sun was shining 10 million years ago. There’s ones that differ from hours in terms of whether there was even the sun at all, whether the sun formed. There are ones that differ from hours in terms of whether any stars formed. I think we’re in a position to know that.

00:49:09.90
Alastair Wilson
um Are there ones that differ from ours in terms of whether there was any ever any stable atomic matter? I think probably yes, cosmology does put us in a position to know that. um Are there alternative possibilities with like different numbers of spatial dimensions from ours? Here we start to run into the limits of knowledge in cosmology. um So in some versions of like fundamental physics and cosmology, ah particularly versions of string theory that get called M theory,

00:49:41.83
Alastair Wilson
then the number of effective dimensions of space and time ah does vary across the different quantum worlds.

00:49:50.30
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:49:51.65
Alastair Wilson
The number of effective dimensions of space in space-time. But there are other accounts of quantum gravity rivals to string theory, where it doesn’t, where all of the quantum possibilities have like three spatial dimensions plus one temporal dimension. So there’s a big question that we just currently, in our current state of knowledge of physics, don’t know the answer to. Could there have been more than three spatial dimensions? and But it’s exactly the kind of question that progress in physics could, on the quantum motorist view, eventually reveal to us.

00:50:24.89
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:50:25.18
Alastair Wilson
Because if it turns out that string theory gets vindicated, then we’ll know what there could have been more. Maybe we could only have ever survived in a world with three spatial dimensions, but there could have been six of them. um Whereas if some other non-string theory approach is vindicated, then we’ll find that actually there couldn’t have been um six spatial dimensions. All of the different quantum possibilities ah actually have the same number of spatial dimensions. And that sort of progress is kind of within, I mean, maybe we’re not going to find out for sure tomorrow, which is the truth. But, you know, within 50 years, we’ve got a good chance of like, like coming to a reasonably confident view as to whether string theory is correct or not, I think.

00:51:09.58
Alastair Wilson
And suppose we do, we’ll be well we know we’ll have a way of settling these deep questions about what what’s possible for our universe. um And I love that feature of the view that it makes these philosophical questions about what really could happen directly engaged with real real tangible progress in fundamental physics that we kind of don’t know if we’re going to get.

00:51:20.48
multiverses
All

00:51:33.17
Alastair Wilson
We just don’t know how things are going to turn out. And it it kind of it shifts us away from this picture of metaphysics as this kind of timeless thing that like people 4,000 years ago were in just as good a position to do as we are today.

00:51:38.76
multiverses
right.

00:51:46.00
Alastair Wilson
ah No, we’re we’re in a really enviable position on this sort of picture. too you know Our ancestors could never have dreamed of having such good evidence about what the real possibilities for the universe are like, as we now do. um And we’re getting it from from fundamental physics and cosmology, um rather than from kind of sitting in an armchair thinking about what we can imagine, which is kind of how philosophers have often approached the problem, working at what possibilities there are.

00:52:16.56
multiverses
Yeah, yeah, it’s it’s an exciting time. And how should we, I mean, I’m just curious, how how do you think we should talk about, you know, this idea? Some contenders for our best physics claim that, you know, say that there that there could be alternative, um you know, other other other worlds may have different spatial dimensions. do we say Should we say that’s possible? Or should we say that seems possible? Or should we say that’s possible according to this physics?

00:52:46.95
Alastair Wilson
Right. Right.

00:52:49.22
multiverses
um um and But it might turn out that physics is rolling and therefore it was never possible all along.

00:52:53.42
Alastair Wilson
Absolutely. Absolutely. That’s that’s the that last way is the way I would put it. And there’s really two kinds of possibility that we kind of We know how to distinguish an ordinary talk. We do it we kind of without even noticing that we’re doing it most of the time. But that needat they definitely need to be philosophically distinguished and and and disentangled. These are epistemic possibilities. What’s compatible with what we know or what is kind of an open ah open question for us at any given time. And that can change. So like as we get more evidence, that can rule out certain epistemic possibilities.

00:53:32.57
Alastair Wilson
um Whereas what’s really possible in the kind of timeless sense, like what the ways the universe could have turned out like, that doesn’t change over time. Though as time goes by, some options may no longer be there, like live options either.

00:53:43.47
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:53:47.05
Alastair Wilson
um And it’s not a matter of kind of what evidence we’ve got, it’s a matter of kind of how the world is in itself, what what possibilities it it affords. um But because we can but we can we can theorize both about what’s gonna happen in our world, and about what the whole space of possibilities is like. ah And when we theorise about what the whole space of possibilities is like, um Those different alternatives that we’re kind of weighing up, taking seriously, they can only be alternative epistemic possibilities. They can’t be alternative genuine possibilities because what we’re thinking about is which alternative genuine possibilities there are. and It’s not like a genuine possibility that there’d be more genuine possibilities than there in fact are.

00:54:33.88
Alastair Wilson
um So I think of it as something like our degrees of belief and the chances.

00:54:40.83
multiverses
Uh-huh.

00:54:40.92
Alastair Wilson
So there’s real probabilities out there in the world. Like if you’ve got a, you you hand me a die and say, you roll this die. And I think, well, it’s either fair or it’s biased.

00:54:48.31
multiverses
Uh-huh.

00:54:55.25
Alastair Wilson
And I’m not sure which. And I roll it 10,000 times and it lands six, exactly one sixth of the time. And I conclude it’s actually fair. ah So it what kind of it it was fair all along. But maybe if you were a very suspicious character, I might have started off believing it was biased.

00:55:13.48
multiverses
Yeah.

00:55:13.84
Alastair Wilson
So my degree of belief about the way it would turn out differed from the way like the real chance of it landing a certain way. But over time, my degree of belief about the way it will turn out kind of comes into alignment with it the real chance that I see over a long period of time that it is in fact a fair die.

00:55:29.85
multiverses
Uh-huh.

00:55:33.42
Alastair Wilson
um And I think of the objective possibilities of and the subjective possibilities as kind of like that, that the epidemic possibilities are kind of how things could be for us. And the more, as far as we know, and the more we know, the more we’ll be able to bring what we regard as a serious possibility in line with what really is a serious possibility. And in some kind of ideal limit, if we knew everything, then we would be certain that impossible things wouldn’t happen and we would like have our confidence in various things happening exactly matching the physical probability of all those things happening.

00:56:12.19
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:56:13.17
Alastair Wilson
We’re never going to reach that sort of knowledge so we’re always going to have those sorts of two possibilities kind of relevant to our thinking. There’s the stuff which is possible because we can’t rule it out, there’s the stuff which is possible because it really can happen and that and so what we kind of doing when we learn about what really can happen is ruling out various epistemically possible hypotheses that aren’t genuinely possible about what is genuinely possible. So we’re improving our knowledge of the genuine possibilities by discounting the scenarios which seemed possible but turned out not to be.

00:56:55.17
multiverses
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. I think that.

00:56:57.54
Alastair Wilson
And it is i mean you do it is kind of tricky to keep track of those things. But I think we do it a lot of the time, especially, and it’s kind of we do it most easily when like playing games or when when gambling or whatever. ah We’re not inclined to kind of, unless we’re kind of very bad at the game, we’re not inclined to mix up our own expectation with the real chance of a given outcome. Those are two separate sources of uncertainty, kind of two separate kinds of uncertainty. I may not know who’s going to win this hand of poker but who’s going to win is already fixed by the cards. There’s uncertainty in one sense but there’s no uncertainty in the other.

00:57:39.60
multiverses
Yeah, very good. I realise one thing we, and perhaps something that’s been suggested but but not been made explicit is, why do we

00:57:52.85
multiverses
Again, why do but how does these actual Everett worlds around us, um how do they relate to what we should care about in our world?

00:57:54.83
Alastair Wilson
out

00:58:04.09
multiverses
And you know do they solve this problem of regrets, for instance, or, um you know again, within the actual world that we’re in, there’s just going to be one foot way that things are. so How do we make sense of, again, this idea that it seems that things, you know, we want to talk about things having alternate possibilities and there are these other worlds there, but in the kind of strand we’re in, it seems there’s only going to be one way that things are going to be.

00:58:20.04
Alastair Wilson
Thank you.

00:58:37.89
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, um so this is ah this is tough. It’s not easy to explain why we should care about these entities’ possibilities in the same way that it’s not easy to explain why we should care about the physical chances associated with with it with a dice, it with dice that we’re playing with.

00:58:53.78
multiverses
man

00:58:55.71
Alastair Wilson
i mean um

00:58:58.81
Alastair Wilson
Why is it that if this particular die is weighted towards the sixth side, ah that we should expect that it will land sixth more than we should expect it will land one?

00:59:11.66
Alastair Wilson
It’s really hard to give a clear philosophical answer to that question, why it is that the chances kind of compel our beliefs to follow them.

00:59:17.00
multiverses
Mm hmm.

00:59:20.62
Alastair Wilson
and Some people have said it’s actually impossible to solve philosophical problems. It would be like solving a human problem of induction and saying why the future should resemble the past.

00:59:28.14
multiverses
Right.

00:59:28.20
Alastair Wilson
ah You kind of would have to do that if you’re really going to give a good explanation of why we should um defer to the the chances of the known the known chances of a a gambling setup. ah Nonetheless, it is obviously the right thing to do. To be like more confident, oh like on a far on a fair die, of course we should be more confident that it’s going to be one to five than that it is going to be six. It’s like five times more likely to be one to five than it is to be six if you roll it once. um

01:00:00.12
Alastair Wilson
ah How do we know that? Good question. Do we know it? Definitely we do. ah So somehow or other those chances are relevant. And for the quantum modal release, those chances just are like the measure of the alternative possibilities. So the alternative possibilities are relevant, kind of whether we like it or not, and we’re going to have, you know, we may not be in a very good position to explain how that could be so, but nonetheless, we should kind of live with it. I mean, I think the the the kind of start of an explanation is if along the following lines.

01:00:32.55
Alastair Wilson
ah

01:00:35.76
Alastair Wilson
If the many words view is correct, then there’s going to be an awful lot of people just like us, which have different outcomes from what they’re in fact going to have. And if we want to kind of predict the future um and work out what result we’re in fact going to see, we need to take into account, there’s a whole lot of people that we can’t rule out the hypothesis we might be there, that are seeing these different results.

01:00:56.77
multiverses
Yeah.

01:00:59.04
Alastair Wilson
So how should we react to a situation where we know that there’s a lot of people who currently can’t rule out us being any of them, and those all see different results. How should we react? If we knew exactly which person we were going to be, we’d know exactly what result we’re going to see. We wouldn’t need any uncertainty. But we can’t know that because they’re like all indistinguishable up to the present time. So we have to kind of divide our confidence somehow over us being this person that’s going to see one thing or this person that’s going to see the other. um you know If it was a quantum dice roll with like six different outcomes,

01:01:34.13
Alastair Wilson
We’d want to consider all the people that are going to see one, all the people that are going to see two, all the people that are going to see three, all the people that are going to see four, all the people that are going to see five, all the people that are going to see six. And all of those people, right that as of now, are completely indistinguishable from each other. So nothing you can look at in the world right now is going to tell you which one of those you’re going to be.

01:01:51.76
multiverses
No.

01:01:55.98
Alastair Wilson
So the only thing available to set your confidence by is what is like physical facts about those worlds. And the only available option are the quantum mechanical weights of the branches or the probabilities associated with each outcome. And there are various kind of philosophical arguments to give that kind of if you’re going to set your degrees of belief at all, you should set them following the quantum weights because they’re kind of the only good candidates for something to set your beliefs by.

01:02:29.04
Alastair Wilson
Some people think that settles it. I don’t really think that settles it because maybe there is always like there’s no rational way to set our beliefs or we should just like shrug. I don’t think there’s any kind of um argument that’s going to say you’re irrational if you don’t set your beliefs a certain way. Which is partly the the lesson of skeptical arguments in general, but in particular of humans, skeptical argument against induction. There’s going to be no way of persuading a skeptic that they have to set their beliefs in a given way. But I think in a quantum universe, what we can show is like if you’re going to make us a plan about how to set your beliefs, it had better be the plan that goes with the quantum way that takes account of the distribution of um all the alternative possibilities that there are.

01:03:13.71
Alastair Wilson
So you take the alternative possibilities into account that way by taking into account the probability distribution over them when you’re doing your planning. And the reason for that is ultimately that as far as you know, you could be any of them. You don’t know which one you’re in.

01:03:25.18
multiverses
Mm.

01:03:26.26
Alastair Wilson
So it’s that lack of knowledge. You don’t know which world you’re in. combined with the inability to just like check which world you’re in directly that kind of leads us into this situation where we have to, to if we’re going to like have any kind of coherent belief setting recipe for the future, we have to set it the way we do. So so the world’s kind of getting indirectly in that sort of way. don’t get they They don’t become the things we care about because we can see them. but they become the kind of things we can share about because it’s facts about them which shape how it is that we go about seeking stuff we do want in our world.

01:04:11.51
multiverses
Yeah, I think that gives a clear idea of um of why one might be motivated. um you know Like you said, there may no may not be a um silver bullet argument which links behavior or rationality and um the way that we act with respect to chance.

01:04:29.09
Alastair Wilson
So.

01:04:40.99
multiverses
how does this argument work with respect to, do we can we use the same sort of argument to think about counterfactuals, things that we we could have done, or does it become a little bit harder because there you say, well, um no, it it seemed like, you know although it seemed like I could have got up earlier, actually I am the one in this branch and you know that was always a different, or It is just a different world where someone like me got up earlier. um And therefore, you know why should I care about what happened there? Because now it’s not a question of me um not knowing you know about the the kind of future development of things. And and like I know that I didn’t get up earlier. um So it seems ah a little bit harder to kind of understand

01:05:42.20
multiverses
where the regret comes in. um But on the other hand, one might say, well, actually, that person was just like me, and I can regret that I am not that person, right? Like, why did it turn out that I wasn’t that person? it would Is that the kind of gloss that of of the argument that works?

01:06:02.72
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, I mean, ultimately, I think there’s kind of been no explanation for why things go one chancey way as opposed to another chancey way. um So, you know, you you toss a quantum coin, it lands heads. Why did it land heads and not tails? There’s no like good answer to that question. There simply is a kind of explanatory gap in reality. It lands heads in one branch, it details in another.

01:06:35.48
Alastair Wilson
You ask the person in one branch, what did it land heads? ah The equivalent to asking them, why are you in this branch and not in that branch?

01:06:40.36
multiverses
Hmm. Hmm.

01:06:45.24
Alastair Wilson
And there is just no answer to that. There’s no kind of guarantee that there has to be ah ah like ah an answer to every why question. And certain kinds of why questions on this view just don’t have answers for perfectly good reasons. Of course, there’s a lot of why questions you can answer. Why were the chance of even? well, because of symmetries of the the physical set situation involving the quantum coin, most likely. um Why did the coin land at all? Well, because it was set up and tossed. ah ah

01:07:16.17
Alastair Wilson
Why did it land heads as opposed to know not landing? Well, there was a chance of it landing heads, but there was no chance of it not landing.

01:07:24.22
multiverses
Hmm. Hmm.

01:07:26.40
Alastair Wilson
um a And you can even kind of say, well, kind of if it was a bias call, it was more likely to lend heads than tails. But sometimes unlikely things happen. And you know there’s ultimately no explanation for why one person gets lucky and another person gets unlucky. That’s just luck. That’s the nature of luck. um And so there’s still luck in this world. There’s kind of no luck in in this picture.

01:07:52.85
multiverses
Right.

01:07:53.00
Alastair Wilson
There’s no luck in how the entire set of quantum possibilities develops over time. But there there is unavoidable luck in like where you find yourself in that.

01:08:04.30
multiverses
Right.

01:08:06.10
Alastair Wilson
Let’s say that’s the nature of luck. Some people will be in better spots than others if there’s a lot of people distributed over spots.

01:08:16.41
multiverses
Yeah. Yeah, if anything, I guess it really sharpens the our understanding of of luck in that, you know, there are many, there are many um duplicates of me or however you want to call them who are having exactly the same experience right now, but will have very, very different diverging experiences in the future. And then at some future point, I could look back and say, well, like That could have been me, right? um And really feel it because, you know, we were so um indistinguishable um prior to a certain, I don’t know, chance quantum event, which completely changed the parts of our world.

01:08:45.68
Alastair Wilson
Yeah. It’s always hard thinking about kind of kind of agency in physics because i mean there’s a notorious like kind of free will and determinism sorts of questions. There’s also the question of whether like adding indeterminism seems to help at all. ah But I think the the way to understand kind of ah what one’s doing when one makes a choice in the a quantum multiverse is this kind of deciding how one wants to set the chances.

01:09:27.75
multiverses
Mm.

01:09:28.53
Alastair Wilson
um So it’s it’s a bit like deciding, you know, seeing that a coin is going to be tossed and deciding kind of which side to align yourself with. um So if you think that the chance of it coming up heads is um higher than the chance of it coming up tails, then

01:09:57.66
Alastair Wilson
you’ll think the chance of finding yourself on a heads branch is higher than finding yourself on a tails branch.

01:10:01.52
multiverses
Thanks.

01:10:04.76
Alastair Wilson
And so um you’ll want to take action such as betting on heads, if you have to bet, which will kind of give you the payoff in the higher proportion of the branch, because you think you’re more likely to be find yourself on that side. So you’re more likely to find yourself with the payoff. um So ultimately, kind of decisions are all about the the chances. You want to kind of maximize the chance of finding yourself in a world with a good outcome outcome. And to do that, you need to know what the chances are, and and ideally to be able to kind of control them to some extent um as well.

01:10:44.95
multiverses
Yeah, yeah.

01:10:45.63
Alastair Wilson
but you want to You want not just to be yourself on the world with a good outcome, but ideally you want um to minimize the bad outcomes completely.

01:10:58.65
multiverses
Yeah. I guess my final question and maybe relates to this train of thought is, is there a way in which this conception of of of the world, and such a rich world so full of possibility, does it affect how you kind of think about yourself, not just you know the the papers you write as a philosopher, but the way that you, I don’t know, think about this incredible existence we have?

01:11:30.96
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, it’s tricky, it’s tricky. um Some people very much say that it does, that like you should, um I mean, some people will use this as an objection to the the many worlds view or the quantum motorist view. They say, well, if the totality of everything is going to be the same, whatever I do, then there’s no point doing anything. So if I accepted this view, I would become apathetic or nihilistic or something like that. I wouldn’t be bothered to do anything because I think I couldn’t change the totality of everything. But to me, it seems somewhat, I don’t know, almost narcissistic to think that you what you do only matters in so far as it affects the totality of everything.

01:12:07.53
multiverses
Yeah.

01:12:07.74
Alastair Wilson
um Maybe none of us can affect the totality of everything, but we can still kind of situate ourselves with respect to things that we value. um And so I think it makes perfect sense to kind of continue to act. And in some sense, Like if this mini world view is to be like a serious contender, if it’s to be taken seriously, of course it kind of can’t change our world view too much because we know how to live in a world like this.

01:12:32.87
multiverses
Right.

01:12:36.04
Alastair Wilson
We know the basic parameters of our of our external world. We know what corresponds to like successful life engagement with them. We know like what makes sense to do if you want, if you’re hungry is to go and get something to eat. We just have so much like straightforward secure knowledge of how to interact with our world. but Any theory that said that knowledge was all nonsense just couldn’t be right. There’s a sense in which like if the many worldviews are right, it’s been right all along. So all along, what we’ve been doing is living in one of many quantum worlds, interacting with other creatures inside our quantum world.

01:13:14.73
Alastair Wilson
So it kind of has to make sense that in a quantum world, you should continue to live pretty much the way we do. So I think it would be wrong to expect this sort of view to to revolutionize too much. I think it can maybe give you certain reflective, make available certain sorts of reflection. So for me, one thing it has, I think led to is a reduction in my levels of risk taking over time, because it’s very vivid to me vi the thought that, you know, even if I take a risk and get lucky, there are people um in worlds that really exist that were just like me up to that moment that took that same risk, did not get lucky, and they suffered and maybe their loved ones suffered too.

01:14:00.89
multiverses
Mm.

01:14:01.40
Alastair Wilson
And though I kind of got lucky and turned out not to be one of the unlucky people with unlucky loved ones, nonetheless, those people are ah real, physical and unhappy. And to the extent that you can control the risks, you can control whether there even are such unlucky people. So to the extent that you can choose to reduce your risk, you can you can choose to reduce um the amount of misery. And if you feel like if you take a risk and get away with it, then that’s like,

01:14:39.69
Alastair Wilson
you know that’s ah that’s a no-loss thing, nobody suffers at all, you might be more more open to risk-taking.

01:14:42.07
multiverses
Ah.

01:14:47.25
Alastair Wilson
But I think that that sort of thing is very much a kind of a personal judgment thing. I think it might even be, according to my official view, irrational, to be moved by that sort of reasoning.

01:14:56.01
multiverses
but

01:14:57.93
Alastair Wilson
and People are very irrational, and like i I’m not ashamed of of that. But I think kind of Perhaps the right thing to say is that a purely rational person wouldn’t change their actions at all on coming to be convinced that the Many World View is correct. But because we’re not purely rational creatures, we’re emotional humans, probably some of us will change a bit here and there. People do have strong emotional reactions to it, which suggests that you know people do do care about whether the Many World View is true or not. But I think

01:15:33.60
Alastair Wilson
in terms of whether it would be rational to change your behaviour, I think my official view is no.

01:15:41.57
multiverses
That’s fine. I think it’s it’s good to, this is the forum where you can give your unofficial view and say, well, actually, you know knowing knowing that these things are real, it not only changes the bets that I’m going to place, but whether I roll the dice in the in the first place or which dice I roll, I suppose.

01:16:00.02
Alastair Wilson
Yeah.

01:16:02.46
Alastair Wilson
I mean, it i it makes it harder for me to kind of quite ever understand Everett himself, the originator of the many worlds view, um who ah kind of believed in the reality of all these many worlds. um And yet simultaneously yeah ah had a career in military research doing projects, including one on how to maximize civilian death rates in nuclear weapons campaigns.

01:16:34.35
Alastair Wilson
um He must have known that if his theory was right, kind of doing this was effectively ah killing an awful lot of civilians in an awful lot of possible worlds. He didn’t seem bothered by that. Maybe he was just more rational than we are.

01:16:55.06
multiverses
Right.

01:16:55.27
Alastair Wilson
But is a little bit his his his choices were certainly somewhat his life choices were certainly somewhat off-putting, but I don’t think they were necessarily kind of irrational by his own lives. It really just depends on on what you care about.

01:17:12.71
Alastair Wilson
And believing in the many world view isn’t going to turn you into a nice person. It’s not going to make you care about things that maybe kind of you ought to care about the things that really matter, but it’s gonna tell you kind of what it is to care about something, at least. um So yeah, I i guess the thing the thing that ties, I’ve noticed it ties together different kind of adherents of the Many Worlds approach is like intellectual-mindedness.

01:17:28.85
multiverses
Yeah.

01:17:51.27
Alastair Wilson
it is just a very different looking theory. Even though it says, you know, how things have always looked is just how things in fact look in a quantum multiverse. The way in which things get to look that way is not the way we would have expected.

01:18:08.09
multiverses
yeah

01:18:08.11
Alastair Wilson
We didn’t expect to have encountered the world we see around us in virtue of living as part of a quantum multiverse. So there’s definitely a lot of surprises in there. So you have to be kind of quite open-minded to surprising theories to take it seriously. um But you know if there’s ah if there’s a lot if there’s a if there’s something big and hard to explain, then you might need something quite surprising to explain it with.

01:18:32.84
multiverses
Yeah. Indeed. Yeah, out this has been a really wonderful discussion. And I know your you’re you’re off to do more um theorizing and thinking this afternoon. um So yeah, I just want to say thank you again. um And oh, yes, are there any places?

01:18:55.04
Alastair Wilson
This is

01:18:56.81
multiverses
I mean, I should mention, I’ll mention your book at the beginning. So on contingency, I’ve forgotten the full title. um

01:19:05.60
Alastair Wilson
called The Nature of Contingency, Quantum Physics as Modal Realism.

01:19:10.45
multiverses
Yes, yeah. um Anywhere else that people should confine to you.

01:19:12.06
Alastair Wilson
yep So there’s ah there’s a book coming out soon called Modal Naturalism. science and the modal facts that I’ve co-written with Amanda Bryant, that’s about how science can reveal alternative possibilities. It’s not so much about what it is to be a possibility, so much of which possibilities there are and how science gets a grip on that. um

01:19:38.58
Alastair Wilson
And ah I’ve also got a and as his volume coming out later this year called Levels of Explanation, which is about all the different kinds of explanatory structures all over sciences, philosophy, maths, how we can explain the world at all different levels. Those are the kind of two main projects I’ve been i’ been working on um most recently. ah

01:20:11.94
multiverses
Yeah, I think that would be… um

01:20:13.20
Alastair Wilson
Yeah, I think those are the ones to mention.

01:20:15.00
multiverses
I look forward to that book coming out. And I think that could be another good discussion as I realize, yes, we haven’t touched upon all this work that you’ve done on just general how metaphysics and and and physics and engage. But I think this has been a great example of one place where, in a sense, metaphysics and physics completely merge. And what is metaphysical possibility is just physical possibility. So, yeah, brilliant.

01:20:36.63
Alastair Wilson
yeah my My view is a pretty pretty straightforward. but you know These things overlap intensely and the idea to look for like a kind of sharp dividing line between physics and metaphysics is pointless.

Do Electrons Exist? — Céline Henne: Physicist’s Views on Scientific Realism & Instrumentalism

Physics helps get stuff done. Its application has put rockets in space, semiconductors in phones, and eclipses on calendars.

For some philosophers, this is all physics offers. It is a mere instrument, albeit of great power, giving us control over tangible things. It is a set of gears and widgets (wavefunctions, strings, even electrons) to crank out predictions. In contrast to instrumentalists, scientific realists argue that the success of theories shows that they map onto the structure of the world, symbols in equations carry the imprint of real entities.

This is an old debate in the philosophy of science. While we touch on some arguments for either position, this episode focuses on the phenomenology of physics researchers. What do physicists believe?

Céline Henne is a philosopher at the University of Bologna. Alongside Hannah Tomczyk and Christopher Sperber she has fielded the most comprehensive survey of the attitudes of physicists towards the reality of the objects of their study. From looking at the answers to dozens of questions from several hundred physicists, they have distinguished several camps of belief.

It’s an elegantly designed survey, simply reading the questions forces a consideration of one’s own position.

Take the survey at scientificrealism.multiverses.xyz to see if you are an instrumentalist or a realist (or a bit of both)

As we discuss in the episode, it’s intriguing to see how ChatGPT answers the survey assuming various personas, and reflecting fairly well the positions that philosophers and physicists do take on average.

ChatGPT survey responses

These chats took place using ChatGPT 4o on May 22nd 2024

James Robinson

Imagine you are a theoretical physicist, it has been 10 years since you completed your PhD and are now a tenured professor. I will ask you thirty questions, for each one please reply with a single number from 0 to 100 representing whether you disagree entirely (0) or completely agree (100). Reply “yes” to confirm you understand.

ChatGPT

Yes.

James Robinson

Here are the questions: “Our most successful physics shows us what the world is really like.”, “Physics uncovers what the universe is made of and how it works.”, “Our most successful physics is useful in many ways, … [removed to make this doc shorter] …  best theories represents the structure of the world.”, “Having mutually conflicting theories about the same phenomena is valuable for physics.”, “Our scientific knowledge is the product of the prevailing cultural traditions and historical periods in which they were formulated”, “Scientific theories and models are idealized structures that represent the world from particular and limited points of view.”

ChatGPT

Certainly, here are the responses with the corresponding questions:

  1. “Our most successful physics shows us what the world is really like.” – 75
  2. “Physics uncovers what the universe is made of and how it works.” – 90
  3. “Our most successful physics is useful in many ways, but physics does not reveal the true nature of the world.” – 30
  4. “The imperceptible objects that are part of our most successful physics probably exist. (with ‘imperceptible’ we mean objects that cannot be perceived with our unaided senses, e.g. electrons, black holes, …)” – 85
  5. “The imperceptible objects postulated by physics are only useful fictions.” – 20
  6. “Physicists discover imperceptible objects.” – 80
  7. “Communities of physicists construct imperceptible objects.” – 60
  8. “Our best physical theories are true or approximately true.” – 70
  9. “Physical theories do not reveal hidden aspects of nature. Instead, they are instruments for the classification, manipulation and prediction of phenomena.” – 40
  10. “The most important goal of physics is giving us true theories.” – 80
  11. “If there was a highly advanced civilization in another galaxy, their scientists would discover the existence and properties of many of the imperceptible objects of our current physics.” – 90
  12. “I expect the best current theories in physics to be largely refuted in the next centuries – in the same way that successful theories were largely refuted in the past.” – 50
  13. “Electrons exist.” – 95
  14. “Electrons, with all their properties, exist ‘out there,’ independently from our theories.” – 85
  15. “Our theories are getting closer to the real nature of the electron.” – 75
  16. “Electrons are postulated as real within our models; it does not make sense to ask whether they exist ‘outside’ or independently of the theory/model.” – 55
  17. “There is something in the world that behaves like (what we would define as) an electron.” – 70
  18. “Electrons are (at least) as real as toe-nails and volcanoes.” – 90
  19. “Phonons exist.” – 70
  20. “There really was a Big Bang.” – 80
  21. “General relativity is a true theory.” – 85
  22. “General relativity teaches us about the nature of spacetime.” – 80
  23. “General relativity is not the revelation of an underlying order of nature. It is a tool that helps us make predictions and construct GPS, for example.” – 40
  24. “Newtonian mechanics is a true theory.” – 60
  25. “If a phenomenon can be explained both by a classical model and by a quantum model, neither of the models is closer to the truth than the other.” – 50
  26. “We should build a particle collider that is bigger than the LHC.” – 70
  27. “A physical theory cannot tell us what the universe is really made of, but the mathematical structure of our best theories represents the structure of the world.” – 80
  28. “Having mutually conflicting theories about the same phenomena is valuable for physics.” – 65
  29. “Our scientific knowledge is the product of the prevailing cultural traditions and historical periods in which they were formulated.” – 60
  30. “Scientific theories and models are idealized structures that represent the world from particular and limited points of view.” – 75

Second chat (separate)

Imagine you are a philosopher of science, it has been 10 years since you completed your PhD and are now a tenured professor. I will ask you thirty questions, for each one please reply with a single number from 0 to 100 representing whether you disagree entirely (0) or completely agree (100). Reply “yes” to confirm you understand.

ChatGPT

Yes.

James Robinson

Here are the questions: “Our most …  of the prevailing cultural traditions and historical periods in which they were formulated”, “Scientific theories and models are idealized structures that represent the world from particular and limited points of view.”

ChatGPT

Here are my responses:

  1. “Our most successful physics shows us what the world is really like.” – 60
  2. “Physics uncovers what the universe is made of and how it works.” – 70
  3. “Our most successful physics is useful in many ways, but physics does not reveal the true nature of the world.” – 50
  4. “The imperceptible objects that are part of our most successful physics probably exist. (with ‘imperceptible’ we mean objects that cannot be perceived with our unaided senses, e.g. electrons, black holes, …)” – 80
  5. “The imperceptible objects postulated by physics are only useful fictions.” – 40
  6. “Physicists discover imperceptible objects.” – 65
  7. “Communities of physicists construct imperceptible objects.” – 55
  8. “Our best physical theories are true or approximately true.” – 70
  9. “Physical theories do not reveal hidden aspects of nature. Instead, they are instruments for the classification, manipulation and prediction of phenomena.” – 45
  10. “The most important goal of physics is giving us true theories.” – 75
  11. “If there was a highly advanced civilization in another galaxy, their scientists would discover the existence and properties of many of the imperceptible objects of our current physics.” – 60
  12. “I expect the best current theories in physics to be largely refuted in the next centuries – in the same way that successful theories were largely refuted in the past.” – 70
  13. “Electrons exist.” – 85
  14. “Electrons, with all their properties, exist ‘out there,’ independently from our theories.” – 75
  15. “Our theories are getting closer to the real nature of the electron.” – 65
  16. “Electrons are postulated as real within our models; it does not make sense to ask whether they exist ‘outside’ or independently of the theory/model.” – 50
  17. “There is something in the world that behaves like (what we would define as) an electron.” – 80
  18. “Electrons are (at least) as real as toe-nails and volcanoes.” – 70
  19. “Phonons exist.” – 60
  20. “There really was a Big Bang.” – 85
  21. “General relativity is a true theory” – 70
  22. “General relativity teaches us about the nature of spacetime” – 75
  23. “General relativity is not the revelation of an underlying order of nature. It is a tool that helps us make predictions and construct GPS, for example.” – 55
  24. “Newtonian mechanics is a true theory” – 40
  25. “If a phenomenon can be explained both by a classical model and by a quantum model, neither of the models is closer to the truth than the other.” – 50
  26. “We should build a particle collider that is bigger than the LHC.” – 70
  27. “A physical theory cannot tell us what the universe is really made of, but the mathematical structure of our best theories represents the structure of the world.” – 60
  28. “Having mutually conflicting theories about the same phenomena is valuable for physics.” – 65
  29. “Our scientific knowledge is the product of the prevailing cultural traditions and historical periods in which they were formulated” – 50
  30. “Scientific theories and models are idealized structures that represent the world from particular and limited points of view.” – 65

In a third chat:

James Robinson

Imagine you are an Instagram influencer and performance poet. I will ask you thirty questions, for each one please reply with a single number from 0 to 100 representing whether you disagree entirely (0) or completely agree (100). Reply “yes” to confirm you understand.

ChatGPT

  “Our most successful physics shows us what the world is really like.”: 75,

    “Physics uncovers what the universe is made of and how it works.”: 80,

    “Our most successful physics is useful in many ways, but physics does not reveal the true nature of the world.”: 50,

    “The imperceptible objects that are part of our most successful physics probably exist.”: 85,

    “The imperceptible objects postulated by physics are only useful fictions.”: 40,

    “Physicists discover imperceptible objects.”: 70,

    “Communities of physicists construct imperceptible objects.”: 60,

    “Our best physical theories are true or approximately true.”: 65,

    “Physical theories do not reveal hidden aspects of nature. Instead, they are instruments for the classification, manipulation and prediction of phenomena.”: 55,

    “The most important goal of physics is giving us true theories.”: 90,

    “If there was a highly advanced civilization in another galaxy, their scientists would discover the existence and properties of many of the imperceptible objects of our current physics.”: 75,

    “I expect the best current theories in physics to be largely refuted in the next centuries – in the same way that successful theories were largely refuted in the past.”: 60,

    “Electrons exist.”: 95,

    “Electrons, with all their properties, exist ‘out there,’ independently from our theories.”: 85,

    “Our theories are getting closer to the real nature of the electron.”: 70,

    “Electrons are postulated as real within our models; it does not make sense to ask whether they exist ‘outside’ or independently of the theory/model.”: 50,

    “There is something in the world that behaves like (what we would define as) an electron.”: 90,

    “Electrons are (at least) as real as toe-nails and volcanoes.”: 80,

    “Phonons exist.”: 70,

    “There really was a Big Bang.”: 85,

    “General relativity is a true theory”: 75,

    “General relativity teaches us about the nature of spacetime”: 80,

    “General relativity is not the revelation of an underlying order of nature. It is a tool that helps us make predictions and construct GPS, for example.”: 65,

    “Newtonian mechanics is a true theory”: 60,

    “If a phenomenon can be explained both by a classical model and by a quantum model, neither of the models is closer to the truth than the other.”: 50,

    “We should build a particle collider that is bigger than the LHC.”: 70,

    “A physical theory cannot tell us what the universe is really made of, but the mathematical structure of our best theories represents the structure of the world.”: 65,

    “Having mutually conflicting theories about the same phenomena is valuable for physics.”: 55,

    “Our scientific knowledge is the product of the prevailing cultural traditions and historical periods in which they were formulated”: 75,

    “Scientific theories and models are idealized structures that represent the world from particular and limited points of view.”: 70

David Papineau: How Philosophy Serves Science

Are philosophy and science entirely different paradigms for thinking about the world? Or should we think of them as continuous: overlapping in their concerns and complementary in their tools? David Papineau is a professor at Kings College London and the author of over a dozen books. He’s thought about many topics — consciousness, causation the … Read more